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RELATIONAL CONTRACT AND
OTHER MODELS OF MARRIAGE©
By ROBERT LECKEY*
This article proposes relational contract as a model
for analyzing marriage under Canadian law. In contrast,
in Bracklow v. Bracklow, the Supreme Court of Canada
recognized two "competing" models of marriage and
three models of spousal support. The difficult policy
issues in the law of spousal support relate not to a tension
between different models but instead go to compensation,
including reliance and expectations. This article uses
relational contract to critique Bracklow, considering the
challenges in defining models. The Court's basic social
obligation model and its non-compensatory support are
unjustifiably broad, and its compensatory support is too
narrow. In assessing the extent to which competing
models give couples flexibility in customizing their
relationships, the article discerns in Bracklow the
emergence of new notions of public order in the sphere of
marriage and a sense of not only procedural, but also
substantive, justice.
Cet article propose une analyse de l'institution du
mariage en droit canadien se basant sur un modkle
,,relationnel, du contrat. Dans I'arr6t Bracklow c.
Bracklow, ]a Cour supr6me du Canada a reconnu deux
modules suppos6ment oppos6s du mariage, ainsi que trois
modules de ]'obligation alimentaire entre les 6poux.
Toutefois, scion I'auteur, les questions de politique
juridique les plus difficiles dans le domaine des
obligations entre 6poux ne proviennent pas de
I'opposition de diff6rents modules de Ia relation mais
plut6t de laquestion de lacompensation, entre autres, des
sacrifices (reliance) et des esp6rances 16gitimes de chacune
des parties. Le mod6le relationnel m6ne A une critique de
Bracklow et les difficult6s plus g6n6rales en d6finissant
des mod61es. Ainsi, dans Bracklow le mod6le de
l'obligation sociale fondamentale et lesjustifications non-
compensatoires sont trop tendus, alors que les
justifications compensatoires sont trop 6troites. L'auteur
discerne dans Bracklow 1'dmergence de nouvelles notions
relatives A l'ordre public dans Ia sphere du mariage qui
permettent de rejoindre, au-delA de lajustice proc6durale,
une justice substantive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A dispute over spousal support is a contest between stories. Even
under a regime of no-fault divorce, each spouse attempts to convince the
trial judge of the merits of his or her narrative of the failed marriage-what
was agreed, given, retained and owed. The statutory factors and objectives
that trial judges must balance do not lead to precise accounting entries;
they are merely considerations for the judge in characterizing the marriage
and its lasting enforceable obligations. While the story of each marriage is
unique, patterns emerge and recur, both in informal story-telling about
marriages and in decided cases. Such patterns assist counsel and judges in
imposing order on a couple's understandings and misunderstandings of the
past, and help policy-makers draft default rules.
A marriage may be viewed as a close emotional and financial union
in which the spouses commit to being each other's life partner. As they live
together, spouses become deeply intertwined in mutual dependence and
care; indeed, whether their relationship has a religious or a secular
foundation, their individual identities are more or less subsumed under that
relationship. Consequently, if marriage breaks down, it is difficult for
spouses to disentangle themselves. Even after divorce, one spouse may be
required to support the other, and while this is often viewed as a burden,
it may also be understood as simply a foreseeable consequence of the
original obligation, which was undertaken freely. Within such a model, it is
impossible for one spouse to know at the outset or even during the
marriage the extent of the obligations assumed towards the other spouse in
the event of marriage breakdown; the mutual obligation assumed on
marriage has the potential to cover needs that arise even after termination
of the marriage, as in the event of illness.
Another view, strikingly different, is that of marriage as a
partnership between two equal, independent individuals who unite to
pursue common goals and personal satisfaction, but who retain distinct
identities and interests. While there may be much sharing and
collaboration, if the marriage ends, the parties expect to reassume their
independent status and continue their separate lives. The termination of
marriage is thus an occasion for settling accounts and liquidating
obligations. Subsequently, no further debts can arise. Their obligations
acquitted, the parties may move on, establish new relationships, and assume
new family responsibilities.
While divorcing spouses may disagree about elements of the story
of their marriage even if they agree on its basic narrative, conflict intensifies
when the spouses clash over their relationship's fundamental structure. The
trial judge then has to accept the story of one spouse or the other, or
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integrate parts from both into the court's official story of the marriage,
perhaps adopting a more flexible structure that falls between the two basic
patterns.
In Bracklow v. Bracklow,1 the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed
that Canadian law recognizes the two patterns mentioned here as essential
to its approach to questions of marriage and spousal support. The Court
accepted these patterns as two "competing" theories of marriage, calling
the first the "basic social obligation" model and the second the
"independent, clean-break" model.2 These theories give rise to different
post-marital support obligations. The support flowing from the basic social
obligation model is "non-compensatory," and that associated with the
independent, clean-break model is "compensatory."3 Justice McLachlin (as
she then was) also noted that both models of marriage and their
corresponding spousal-support theories permit individual variation in
contract, providing a third basis for a legal entitlement to support that is
apparently unattached to a marriage model.4 According to the Court, the
trial judge's task is to balance these models and the relevant statutory factors
and to strike a balance that "best achieves justice" in each case.' It is
understandable that the Supreme Court did not elevate one theory over the
other: together the two theories represent a permanent tension in family
law between the individual and the family unit, between independence and
dependence.
Yet maintaining these two competing models as the Court's
approach is unsatisfactory. The effect of two parallel, judicially recognized
models is to preclude the possibility of genuine argument between the
separating parties because the applicant and respondent spouses need not
refute each other's arguments. Instead, relying on different models, both
may be correct. One spouse may say, "You assumed an obligation to
support me for life"; the other may say, "We married as individuals and we
exit the marriage as individuals, I owe you nothing more," and both
positions find authority in the law. The trial judge thus chooses between
I [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, McLachlin J. [hereinafter Bracklow].
2 See ibid. at 434--35. The basic social obligation model is also referred to as the "mutual
obligation" model. See ibid. at 436.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. at 438-9.
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positions that clash not in legal substance, but in radically different desired
outcomes.6
Scholars have, however, developed a model of marriage as
relational contract 7 that integrates the important concerns which the
Supreme Court seeks to protect in recognizing both the social obligation
and independent models. Viewing marriage in such terms does not resolve
disagreements about important aspects of marriage, but it does provide a
rhetorical space in which arguments must clash, and both parties can no
longer be fully and irreconcilably correct. Relational contract would provide
a more flexible and complex pattern for the story of a marriage than does
the maintenance of a tension between two approaches lying at opposite
ends of a spectrum (as the Supreme Court also recently tried to with
equality rights).8 Then the relational contract of a particular marriage,
assessed subjectively or objectively, would be at stake as well as the precise
kind of relational contract and the limits on private ordering that
legislatures and courts wished to promote in Canadian family law.
This article argues that relational contract is the best model for
understanding current Canadian marriage. It begins by addressing marriage
as relational contract on a theoretical level. After briefly sketching the
model, the article tests it against the current law of marriage in
Canada-both federal law and the civilian and common-law provincial
regimes-and the major concerns of commentators and the courts. It
argues that relational contract explains the current regime of spousal
support better than models of civil wrong or unjust enrichment, and frames
more clearly the difficult policy decisions not yet fully addressed by
Parliament. While it does not provide instant solutions, relational contract
6 A good example is the quantum decision Bracklow v. Bracklow (1999), 181 D.L.R. (4th) 522 at
525--6, 529-530 (B.C.S.C.), Smith J.
7 See e.g. L. Cohen, "Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; Or, I Gave Him the Best Years of My
Life" (1987) 16 J. Legal Stud. 267 at 267-68. On relational contract more generally, see e.g. I.R. Macneil,
The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1980) at xii-xiii, 10-35 [hereinafter New Social Contract]. For a Canadian perspective, see the work
of J.-G. Belley, "L'entreprise, l'approvisionnement et le droit. Vers une th~orie pluraliste du contrat"
(1991) 32 C. de D. 253 at 258 [hereinafter "Une th~orie pluraliste du contrat"], who recognizes the
"importance centrale" of Macneil's theory, though he situates it slightly differently, within legal
pluralism.
8 Endorsement of a relational contract model might be akin to the Supreme Court's recent
development of a unified approach to equality. See Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, integrating the two major approaches to equality and that of Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6.
[VOL. 40, No. 2
Relational Contract and Other Models of Marriage
offers "increased clarity"9 and an analysis for addressing the important
concerns, such as women's poverty after divorce, that underlie the social
obligation model. Unlike the latter, however, relational contract is not
contradictory as a source of obligations in light of contemporary marriage
and no-fault divorce. Relational contract is better than the competing
models in Bracklow at accommodating the changes that transpire during
long-term intimate relationships and that potentially render one spouse
economically vulnerable relative to the other. The proposed model also
assists in understanding the ambiguous status of marriage both as an
institution in which society is implicated and as a private relation. This
complex positioning is evidenced in the acceptance of prenuptial contracts
and separation agreements modifying default rules, palliated by the caution
that courts demonstrate in their enforcement. Insights about potential
errors in contracting within the relational contract of marriage militate for
continued caution. Furthermore, the extension of some marriage
obligations to unmarried couples also proves consistent with the relational
contract model.
Next, the article applies the relational contract model to critique the
Supreme Court's models of marriage in Bracklow. At the same time, this
article explores, more generally, potential difficulties in using legal models
in adjudication. The Bracklow judgment is problematic in a number of
respects. It illustrates the importance of adequately defining competing
models. Specifically, concerning spousal support, the argument is that the
Supreme Court's competing models are not distinct enough to be
analytically useful. Moreover, the basic social obligation or non-
compensatory model is unjustifiably broad given the current no-fault
divorce regime. The compensatory model, as set out, is too narrow, and
would benefit from the insights of what compensation can mean viewed
from a relational contract perspective. The competing models in Bracklow
raise questions of the boundaries of their application, as do legal models
more generally. First, a competition between models suggests a regime of
choice and considerable freedom by parties to craft their own terms, but
Bracklow is a reminder that there are always limits on private ordering.
Indeed, the judgment indicates the emergence of a new conception of an
See H.O. Hunter, "An Essay on Contract and Status: Race, Marriage and the Meretricious
Spouse" (1978) 64 Va. L. Rev. 1039 at 1097, on the limited utility of models such as status and contract.
As categories, status and contract may, in fact, be "rhetorically entangled" and "mutually
interdependent." See J. Goldberg-Hiller, "'Making a Mockery of Marriage': Domestic Partnership and
Equal Rights in Hawai'i" in C. Stychin & D. Herman, eds., Law and Sexuality: The Global Arena
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001) 113 at 118-19.
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untouchable public order core of substantive, as opposed to procedural,
justice that cannot be contracted out of. Second, as the application of the
Bracklow judgment to both married and unmarried couples attests, legal
models do not necessarily reify distinctions, as would be expected, but may
instead blur them by influencing decision making concerning similar but
nevertheless distinct institutions. In other words, they are not easily
confined to the situation for which they were articulated. Finally, the article
considers the lessons from this analysis.
It is appropriate here to note some limitations of this article. First,
though it is a criticism of the social obligation theory, which is related to a
status concept of marriage, this article is not a recital of any "linear
evolution" of marriage from status to contract. 10 Today, the position of
marriage between these two poles is at best "equivocal,"'1 and while the
argument is that relational contract provides a superior model for marriage
as that institution has developed, the status quo was not inevitable and
marks no culmination. Second, this argument is limited to marriage and
spousal support within Canada, referring to what may be a unique
combination-for example, the factors in the Divorce Act 2 and Canada's
comparatively advanced recognition of unmarried couples. The relational
contract model has not necessarily been "forming underneath everything
that grows."' 3 This article deals only peripherally with the question of child
support, while recognizing the difficulty of sustaining distinctions between
spousal and child support, 14 and does not attempt to treat same-sex
relationships in any depth. Lastly, this argument is grounded on a position
of skepticism concerning the power of family law to dramatically improve
people's lives. Replacing the two competing models of marriage and the
three theories of support entitlement with relational contract would neither
eradicate post-divorce poverty nor equalize unequal relations between
10 See e.g. M. Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows: Toward a History of Family
Law" [ 1985] Wis. L. Rev. 819 at 826, who challenges such "traditional" histories of family law as "deeply
flawed." See ibid. at 834.
See e.g. J. Carbone, "Economics, Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony: A Reply to Ira
Ellman" (1990) 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1463 at 1469.
12 R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 3, s. 15.2. For example, one important respect in which Canada differs
from the United States, the world's greatest producer of academic literature on contract, marriage, and
divorce, is the comparative inattention paid in Canada to the evolution towards no-fault divorce.
American journal articles on the subject-many fiercely critical-are too numerous to mention.
13 This image for legal patterns developing unseen comes from Minow, supra note 10.
See Francis v. Baker, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250 at 275-6 for judicial recognition of the practical
difficulty of isolating child support and child expenses.
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spouses. Yet while a relational contract view of marriage provides no
"obvious or optimistic" solutions,15 this article seeks to show that it would
nevertheless provide a single, clearer, and more sensitive model. Relational
contract would acknowledge the potential for serious inequality in intimate
relations and offer a reasonably coherent legal framework, both for future
policy debates and for the thousands of unhappy couples fighting in court.
II. MARRIAGE AS RELATIONAL CONTRACT
A. Definitions
Theorists struggle to define relational contract. American scholar
Ian Macneil does so by contrasting it with discrete or transactional
contracts, in which no relation exists between the parties other than the
"simple exchange of goods."' 6 The paradigm of such discrete contract is the
transaction of neo-classical microeconomics. While both discrete and
relational contract involve such exchange, the latter is notable because it
includes significant elements of "non-economic personal satisfaction."' 7
Macneil has devised lists of characteristics that distinguish relational
contracts from more shallow transactions, for example, "commencement,
duration, and termination; measurement and specificity; planning; sharing
versus dividing benefits and burdens; interdependence, future co-operation,
and solidarity; personal relations among, and numbers of, participants; and
power."' 8 Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have identified relational
contract by the parties' inability to reduce the arrangement to "well-defined
15 See Cohen, supra note 7 at 303, who finds it difficult to suggest "with any conviction" a definitive
solution to the marriage problem. But for the less cautious view that identifiable changes to statutory
family law could potentially benefit spouses, "their children, and society at large," see M.F. Brinig,
"Contracting around No-Fault Divorce" in F.H. Buckley, ed., The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999) 275 at 279.
16 See New Social Contract, supra note 7 at 10. On some of the terminological difficulties in
defining relational contract theory, and his own admittedly too-late efforts to replace some of his own
terms, see I.R. Macneil, "Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries" (2000) 94 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 877 at 892-97.
17 See I.R. Macneil, "The Many Futures of Contracts" (1974) 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691 at 723.
18 See I.R. Macneil, "Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for
a 'Rich Classificatory Apparatus' (1981) 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1018 at 1025 [footnote omitted, hereinafter
"Economic Analysis of Contracts"]. Other slightly different lists appear elsewhere in his work, but this one
is typical.
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obligations.' 9 More simply, and much later in the theory's development,
Melvin Eisenberg observed that a relational contract involves "not merely
an exchange, but also a relationship, between the parties.,' 21 Yet this short
definition fails to recognize that defining "relational contract" is a challenge
chiefly because "contract," "exchange," "relationship," and even "parties"
are words with contested, contingent meanings. Eisenberg's definition thus
incorporates a number of other unresolved debates. In particular, his
suggestion that it is a yes-or-no question whether a contract is only an
exchange or an exchange combined with a relationship ignores Macneil's
argument that exchanges within society fall on a spectrum between pure
discrete transaction and pure relation, themselves both heuristic fictions.
The argument in this article, however, does not depend on the
outcome of such disagreements within the literature on relational contract;
there is considerably more consensus around at least the basic notion of
marriage as relational contract. For example, Cohen writes that upon
marriage the spouses exchange promises to deliver a "lifetime stream of
spousal services.', 21 In reliance on these promises, each party invests in
assets specific to this marriage and forgoes other opportunities and
activities. In the relational contract literature, investments made specifically
for the marriage and that are not transferable, such as a decision to leave
a career and to raise the children, are identified as "idiosyncratic."
The marriage contract is highly relational in this sense. The letter
of its obligations and exchanges cannot be set out completely at the
beginning, or at least it is inefficient to attempt to do so, and the
commitments made initially do not, except in a vague, hortatory way,
exhaust everything the parties expect to occur within the relationship.
Indeed, Cohen observes the striking "lack of explicit detail. 22 Moreover,
beyond the gaps in promise, much of a marriage relation is likely to be what
Macneil calls "non-promissory," arising not from the parties' promises but
"otherwise from the relation itself."23 He means that the relationship's
content simply develops from the parties' interactions during ifs life.
19 See C.J. Goetz& R.E. Scott, "Principles of Relational Contracts" (1981) 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089
at 1091.
2 0 See M.A. Eisenberg, "Relational Contracts" in J. Beatson & D. Friedmann, eds., Good Faith and
Fault in Contract Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 291 at 296 [hereinafter "Relational Contracts"].
21 See Cohen, supra note 7 at 267.
22 See ibid. at 272, where Cohen suggests that this vagueness makes a marriage contract like an
employment contract.
23 See New Social Contract, supra note 7 at 28.
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More specifically, this article uses relational contract to mean a
relationship between two individuals in which they seek not only economic,
but also non-economic and emotional support. The relationship is notable
for the source of its obligations: a mixture of promise, though the nature of
the intimate relationship lived over time is such that it is impossible to
express exhaustively all the obligations ex ante; tacit agreement, with
obligations arising from the parties' interaction; and at times, statutory
imposition. The relationship is founded upon a shared project, which
includes the maintenance of a household, often the raising of children, and
given the human need for companionship, a deep interest on the part of
each party in the continuation of the relationship itself. Given their
commitment to the relationship's continuation, the parties in such
relational contracts are typically optimistic and do not make decisions that
take into account the statistical probability of the relationship's rupture. In
the event the relationship ends, the notion of the shared enterprise leads to
a calculation of losses using a measure of reliance and expectation. Since
losses are shared, damages within a relational contract are not necessarily
premised on one party's breach. In this sense, the end of a marriage may
almost be viewed as a superior force, since, although it is not statistically
unforeseeable when contemporary marriages are viewed collectively, it is
an outcome that neither party expected on entering that relationship. This
model will be developed further in the course of this article. Like other
legal models, it does not contain concrete policy outcomes. It is a
methodology that provides an orientation and a means of organizing the
design of systems and legal rules.
Viewing marriage as relational contract is sometimes criticized for
reducing everything to economics and failing to account for the affective
aspects of intimate relationships.24 It is possible that the contractualizing of
marital obligations such as fidelity may trivialize them; I am admittedly less
comfortable than some law and economics theorists with computing sexual
relations as merely one more good contributing to a family's welfare, to be
exchanged among utility maximizers. Indeed, many would find it
unromantic to characterize the marriage market as a forum in which self-
interested individuals exercise preferences and contract for long-term
economic alliances. Yet some discussion of relational contract attempts to
include non-economic aspects of marriage. For example, Elizabeth Scott
24 See e.g. M.C. Regan Jr., Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of Marriage (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999) at 162-87, on the risks of "property rhetoric."
25-See e.g. E. Landes, "Economics of Alimony" (1978) 7 J. Legal Stud. 35 at 40.
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and Robert Scott describe marriage qua contract as a deep emotional
commitment.26 Macneil draws parallels between contractual relations and
what sociologists call "primary relations," where parties respond to each
other as whole persons, with deep and extensive communication, and where
personal satisfactions are paramount. More generally, relational contracts
differ from transactional contracts in that the former recognize that the
preservation of the relationship itself is one objective of the parties,' that
partners are not fungible, and that contract is not a casual way of
recognizing marital love. Any objection about relational contract's lack of
romance might resonate less with civilians, already accustomed to dissecting
the substance of conjugal relationships in connection with the codified
obligation defaire vie commune.29
It is also necessary to highlight the usage of two words. When
relational contract theorists discuss "contract," they mean a relation lived
over time. As noted, this article does not contrast marriage as relational
contract with marriage as status; today no one really argues that legal
marriage is entirely a status relationship imposed by the state, although
remnants of such thinking persist. It is also easy to confuse legal marriage
with marriage as a religious sacrament. In contrast to relational contract
theorists, those closer to the status notion of marriage use "contract" not
for the relation itself, but rather for the act of promising that forms the
contract, constitutes the legal relationship and invokes state recognition.3 °
This distinction is sometimes imprecise when discussing marriage, though
the distinction is clearer in discussing unmarried cohabitation. Relational
contract theorists may see unmarried cohabitants as living a relational
contract; status theorists may see them as having no contract at all.
"Marriage" is prone to similar confusion and uncertainty. In this
article, "marriage" refers to the relationship lived by the parties, and
"wedding" to their initial state-sanctioned promising ceremony. This
26 See e.g. E.S. Scott & R.E. Scott, "A Contract Theory of Marriage" in Buckley, supra note 15,
201 at 202, 208.
2 7 See "The Many Futures of Contracts," supra note 17 at 722-23.
28 See "Une th6orie pluraliste du contrat," supra note 7 at 283.
29 Art. 392 C.C.Q. See also the discussion in N. Kasirer, "What Is Vie Commune? Qu'est-ce que
living together?" in M9langes Paul-Andrd Crdpeau (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 1997) 487 at 495
[hereinafter "What Is Vie Commune?"] on the tension between rationalism and sentimentality in
defining marital duties.
30 See C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1981) at 21. For this notion of promise as constituting a marriage, see e.g.
Miron v. Trudel, [199512 S.C.R. 418 at 450, Gonthier J., dissenting [hereinafter Miron].
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distinction, too, is more important for unmarried than married couples:
unmarried couples may well live what looks like a marriage, though they
have had no wedding. But even in a marriage context, the distinction
assumes significance in cases of short marriages, where the wedding qua
ceremony presumably carries the same weight as always, but the
relationship lived over time may reasonably carry much less." The article
turns now to how relational contract accommodates the serious concerns
about marriage that emerge from the case law and doctrine.
B. Concerns about Marriage
1. Spousal support
Alimony or spousal support after divorce embarrasses theorists
because it has little prima facie justification. The positivist answer-that
Canadian spouses can get an order for alimony because the DivorceAct says
they can- offers little aid in interpreting statutes.32 The literature on
spousal support, particularly under no-fault divorce regimes, is too vast to
be summarized here. This section suggests why two legal models sometimes
associated with spousal support-civil wrong and unjust enrichment-are
inappropriate and indicates how relational contract at least frames
questions or possibilities.
Analyzing a marriage breakdown according to the current regime
as a civil wrong is of limited use for several reasons.33 First, none of the
possibilities leads to a satisfactory characterization of the compensable
fault. Although one party's behaviour may have precipitated the end of the
marriage, the current statutory regime of no-fault divorce suggests that a
31
See e.g. Droit de lafamille-2071, [1994] R.J.Q. 2933 (Sup. Ct.), justifying a derogation from the
equal division of the family patrimony under art. 422 C.C.Q.
32 Chouinard J. articulates this positivist view, distinguishing the statutory alimentary obligation
after divorce from the marital alimentary obligation during mere separation from bed and board, in
Messier v. Delage, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 401 at 408.
See Justice Boyle's interpretation of Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 [hereinafter Moge] in
Bracklow v. Bracklow (1995), 13 R.F.L. (4th) 184 at 188 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Bracklow (trial)]. The
Court of Appeal would have preferred a "different choice of words" but saw no error in the trial judge's
analysis. See Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1997] 8 W.W.R. 696 at 700 (B.C.C.A.), Proudfoot J.A. In contrast,
Bracidow rejects the tort analogy, but such analysis has persisted enough that it merits comment.
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court will not inquire into marital "misconduct. 3 4 In any case, few would
advocate a return to a fault regime where spouses spy on each other to
amass evidence proving the other's perfidy.3" Next, it is difficult to equate
the act of seeking a divorce with negligent or faulty conduct, particularly
given its statutory facilitation.36 A more complex, but ultimately insufficient
act, is the facilitation by the economically superior spouse of the other
spouse's specialization in domestic labour, for example, that resulted in the
latter's economic disadvantage on conclusion of the relationship. The
deterrence connotations of such a characterization as a civil wrong giving
rise to damages are inappropriate. Damages suggest that the defendants
had a duty to act otherwise but instead engaged in "socially undesirable
conduct."37 Such a value judgment is contrary to society's interest in stable
and productive marriages. Family law's role is surely not to discourage men
and women from making sacrifices for the good of a marriage. Indeed, such
idiosyncratic investments may be essential to the success of long-term
relationships: by making it impossible for the the parties to walk away
without suffering some loss, deep investments encourage them to stay
together. While society may endorse the idea that either spouse should be
able to support him- or herself if necessary, there is no social consensus that
it is the law's role to deter spouses from staying home to raise children. A
no-fault regime, based on the risk principle,3" may have social utility and
come closer to capturing the statutory spousal support scheme, but is far
removed from the classical fault model.
Second, the causal connection sometimes required in spousal
support cases between the marriage breakdown and the financial difficulties
of the applicant spouse is rarely set as high as under civil liability regimes.
Judges seek some link, but do not require direct causation satisfying the
civil standard of proof.
34 Divorce Act, supra note 12, s. 15.2(5). See the discussion of the relationship between tort and
no-fault divorce in an American context in I.M. Ellman & S.D. Sugarman, "Spousal Emotional Abuse
as a Tort?" (1996) 55 Md. L. Rev. 1268 at 1285.
35 This is not to suggest that there are never instances in marriages where tort and assessment of
personal loss are strikingly appropriate and compensation is owed by one spouse as a wrongdoer. For
example, abuse and mental cruelty amounting to criminal conduct should clearly give rise to tort
damages.
36 Divorce Act, supra note 12, s. 8(1).
37 See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 34 at 1287.
38 See e.g. J.-L. Baudouin & P. Deslauriers, La responsabiliticivile, 5th ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon
Blais, 1998) at paras. 131ff.
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Third, spousal support awards are not set, like damages, to
compensate fully. Though it is worth little, a successful plaintiff can get an
award for civil liability damages from a penniless defendant. In contrast, the
Divorce Act requires consideration of the resources of each spouse,
indicating that a court is unlikely to award spousal support which, while
merited as compensation, outstrips the respondent spouse's ability to pay.39
Fourth, a relationship as intimate as that between spouses pushes
the utility of a civil fault regime to its limits.4" In the civilian system, civil
responsibility requires only fault, causation, and prejudice. By contrast,
common-law tort requires at least a duty of care linking the plaintiff and
defendant. Nevertheless, both civilian and common law civil fault apply
clumsily in this context because of the parties' interconnectedness and the
prospective character of the spousal support frequently sought. Damages
awarded for personal injury are prospective in the sense that they indemnify
for future lost earnings that the plaintiff would have earned had he or she
never encountered the defendant. They may be characterized, then, as
relating to expectations. In contrast, what is frequently at issue in divorce
cases is not the earning power of the homemaker wife had the husband not
committed the fault, but rather the benefits she would have derived had he
stayed in the marriage and continued to generate the majority of the
household's income. The fault model poorly accommodates a wrongful act
that frustrates the expectation of a future benefit accruing from the
defendant.41 In a way suggestive of contract, civil wrong thus comes closer
to penalizing non-performance of an obligation rather than fault.
Finally, even if it is possible to cram the facts into it, the civil wrong
model is simply unconvincing. Given spouses' commitment to the
relationship, they do not act in the forward-looking, prudent way of the
reasonable person;42 rather, they commit deeply, even rashly, to a life
together and the pursuit of shared goals. As evidence of the unsuitability of
39 Divorce Act, supra note 12, s. 15.2(4).
40 Although the facts are evidently different, Dobson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Dobson, [1999]
2 S.C.R. 753, perhaps indicates tort's conceptual constraints in a context where, at least historically, as
with marriage under the common law, there was a legal unity of personhood.
41 This difficulty lies at the core of conceptual troubles with an action in tort action brought with
one for breach of an employment contract and led to the requirement of a separate actionable wrong.
See Wallace v. United Grain Growers, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 at 734.
42 Perhaps the prudence of the negligence-avoidance mentality is more visible in the early stages
of dating, when invitations and the days between phone calls are counted and the value of gifts
calibrated, although such conduct may be characterized more persuasively as a courtship signalling
game. See E. Posner, "Family Law and Social Norms" in Buckley, supra note 15, 256 at 260.
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the civil wrong characterization, it teaches little about how, empirically,
married couples behave. In contrast, relational contract literature not only
provides a model that accounts for the legal results currently observable,
but also further illuminates the conduct of married couples.
The equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment appears better suited
to the project than the civil wrong. It provides for restitution when one
spouse is impoverished, the other is correspondingly enriched, and there is
no juristic justification. Accordingly, when a marriage ends, the spouse who
has worked for money may owe the homemaker spouse for unpaid labour
performed in the home or for improvements made to property. The
compensation may be determined according to a value-received or a value-
retained approach, though the Supreme Court prefers the latter, and the
remedy is frequently proprietary, in the form of a constructive trust.43
Yet unjust enrichment proves inadequate for modelling the current
support regime. The market tends to devalue domestic labour of the sort
that women have traditionally performed at home. Thus even a generous
market assessment of one spouse's enrichment may not reflect the extent
to which Parliament wishes the other spouse compensated for her
impoverishment." Moreover, even if valuation were considered fair, it is
impossible for courts to create a "notional ledger" to record every service
rendered; the quantum meruit approach leads to the "futile invocation of a
spectral accountant. '45 However, such a straight compensation approach
is not reflected in current Canadian spousal support. Similar to the case of
civil fault, the stipulation that courts consider the "condition, means, needs
and other circumstances" of the parties46 requires a much subtler
assessment than full restitution to the extent of the value retained under
unjust enrichment. Furthermore, while unjust enrichment doctrine speaks
of "expectations,, 47 those expectations relate to the assumption that past
labour would be compensated, and not to the extent of future support or
exchange between the parties. Unjust enrichment's retrospective restitution
(if judges follow its principles, instead of simply pursuing substantive
43 See e.g. Peter v. Beblow, [1993] 1 S.C. R. 980 [hereinafter Peter]. The civil law stipulates that the
measure is value retained (art. 1495 C.C.Q.).
44 See the discussion in Regan, supra note 24 at 171. But see McLachlin J.'s optimism in Peter, ibid.
at 993-94, that the Supreme Court of Canada now values domestic labour.
See the comments in R.E. Scane, "Relationships 'Tantamount to Spousal', Unjust Enrichment,
and Constructive Trusts" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 260 at 281.
46 Divorce Act, supra note 12, s. 15.2(4).
47 See e.g. Peter, supra note 43 at 990.
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justice48) is not broad enough to recognize the future discount of a wife's
earning potential resulting from her absence from the labour market.
Finally, although the concept of unjust enrichment is distinct from its
possible remedies,49 it remains closely linked conceptually with the
constructive trust, and as such is more likely to assist property-owning
claimants whose spouses own property than claimants whose spouses do
not. For example, the value-retained model does little to recognize a future
obligation to assist the economically disadvantaged middle-aged spouse
with few assets except her husband's earning power. An unjust enrichment
determination may, in a number of cases, parallel that achieved by the
current statutory and jurisprudential law, but an appropriate legal model
will apply more generally than does unjust enrichment.
Furthermore, civil wrong and unjust enrichment characterizations
polarize a divorce dispute between a claimant, on the one hand, and the
respondent and his (typically) property on the other. Relational contract looks
to the gains and losses of both parties, not as against another party, but rather
as a result of the joint endeavour." Characterizing a woman's financial
disadvantage as the result of the relationship, which she herself helped to
structure, rather than of particular behaviour by the man, presents her less as
a victim, provided it is not taken to an extreme that blames her for her current
financial precariousness. Such a characterization positions the woman as
reclaiming her investments from a failed enterprise, rather than as seeking the
man's property. The focus is on the gains and losses from the relationship
itself.
51
Relational contract is a broad model that provides a number of ways
to analyze spousal support. Some of them purport not to be contractual, but
may seem to be so ultimately. One contractual approach does not rely on the
relational character of marriage and operates even within a contractual
48
See Justice McLachlin's comments in ibid. at 987.
49 Ibid. This distinction is clearer in the civil law, where, unlike in the common law, the codified
principle appears abstractly from particular cases. See art. 1493 C.C.Q.
50 The notion of ajoint venture is discernible in the regime of the family patrimony, which includes
certain property irrespective of which spouse owns it. See art. 414 C.C.Q. Compare the equalization of
matrimonial property under the Family LawAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 5 [hereinafter FLA], which still
makes one party claim property clearly owned by the other party.
SI See e.g. N. Duclos, "Breaking the Dependency Cycle: The Family Law Act Reconsidered"
(1987) 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. I at 27.
5 2 See e.g. I.M. Ellman, "The Theory of Alimony" (1989) 77 Cal. L. Rev. I at 13--33, denying that
his theory of compensating the wife for her lost earning power is contractual. But for the argument that
Ellman's position is, in fact, contractual, see Carbone, supra note II at 1468-71.
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transaction: upon marriage, X promises Y that, in return for investments or
sacrifices that Y will make, such as giving up a career to raise their children,
X will support Y. When X and Y marry they also make a number of other
promises. It is, of course, possible to recast this scenario as a mutual promise
that X and Y will provide for each other. In a vast number of cases, however,
when the parties specialize-the traditional arrangement sees one in
homemaking, the other in paid work, though a subtler specialization is more
common-it is clear who is becoming economically vulnerable for the couple's
mutual benefit. In such circumstances, there is an air of fiction in the
characterization of the support obligation as mutual, as there is with promise
theory generally.
Other notions more dependent on the relational aspect of marriage
come closer to describing the current state of the Canadian statutory regime
of spousal support. It is possible to suggest that in marrying the parties
establish expectations as to what will happen if the relationship ends,
irrespective of fault. Alternatively, it may be more satisfactory to provide
restitution for a woman's career sacrifices in the interests of the children or the
husband's career. 3 After all, the wife's foregone opportunities in the labour
market may well constitute the "major lost cost" of the marriage as a joint
endeavour; indeed, if during the marriage the husband made investments
chiefly in his own earning power, they are presumably not lost costs at all, but
rather portable assets that survive the marriage." This raises calculation
questions as to whether a debtor spouse should compensate for past earnings
foregone by the other spouse, for her lost earning capacity, or both.55 Such
restitution can be framed without requiring proof of fault or full
compensation at market prices, as spreading the costs or investments made in
the relationship that crystallize on its termination. Until divorce or at least
separation, the sacrifices presumably are made as the result of a "lifestyle
preference" for the benefit of both spouses. 6 Relational contract makes
familiar the "social policy" notion of parties' sharing risks and losses so as to
limit individual "catastrophic losses,"57 and while it is clearly no longer public
policy to save a marriage at all costs, it is probably still a policy objective to
53 See e.g. J. Carbone & M.F. Brinig, "Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform" (1991) 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953 at 986.
54 See Landes, supra note 25 at 44-45.
55 See the thorough discussion in Ellman, supra note 52 at 49-81.
56 See ibid. at 71.
57 See D.A. Farber, "Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory" (1983) 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 303
at 335-36.
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discourage casual divorce. Accordingly, it is better that the wife's losses be
shared, rather than compensated fully, so that the end of the marriage
imposes costs on both spouses. This responds to the concern that full
compensation not render the wife "largely indifferent," at least economically,
to sustaining or terminating the marriage.58 While some commentators are
wary of expressing marriage obligations in the contractual language of
economic entitlement and compensation, such sharing of costs and losses
could well lead to spousal support payments much more generous than those
with which Canadian applicants are familiar, addressing what is for many
commentators a key policy imperative.59 The factors in the Divorce Act,
however, limit full compensation. Since a court considers the applicant's
circumstances as well as the respondent's,6 ° it is not simply a matter of the
applicant demonstrating losses per se. Perhaps the expectation is that the
contract between the parties will provide for some temporary equalization
between their respective financial positions on divorce.
Given the possible alternative characterizations of spousal support,
casting the problem in relational contract terms generates no automatic
answers. It does, however, provide a powerful vocabulary and range of
possibilities, many of which are absent from the Court's definition of
compensatory support in Bracklow. As will be discussed below, the Court's
compensatory model, while considering career losses and sacrifices, was
narrow enough to necessitate the basic social obligation model. The factors in
the Divorce Act fit reasonably well into analysis of marriage as relational
contract; there is mutual exchange and investment of energy and assets in the
relationship, which develops over time. Indeed, the nuanced account of
marriage resulting from a relational contract model better accords with the
dynamic relationship between support regimes and property division under
provincial law.61 Relational contract assists in recognizing the respective gains
and losses of parties upon divorce, though as a model it, of course, cannot
answer policy questions as to how fully those losses should be compensated,
58 See the discussion of this notion in the principal Canadian article treating marriage as relational
contract, M.J. Trebilcock & R. Keshvani, "The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and
Economics Perspective" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 533 at 557.
59 For example, Scott & Scott (supra note 26 at 239) suggest that, if specialization of labour
involving domestic tasks is performed for the benefit of both spouses, the spouses would predictably
agree ex ante to "greater protection against financial loss" than the law currently awards to the spouse
staying at home.
60 Divorce Act; supra note 12, s. 15.2(4).
61 On the subtleties and challenges of this relationship, in particular concerning pensions, see
Justice LeBel's dissent in Boston v. Boston, [2001] 2 SC.R. 413 at 445ff. [hereinafter Boston].
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or how reliance and expectations will be identified and assessed. The
competing marriage models in Bracklow obscure the work that remains to be
done, because Parliament and society agree neither on the extent to which the
law should spread the losses realized when a marriage ends nor on which
expectations should be legally recognized as reasonable. Making these
determinations requires, among other things, a sophisticated behavioural
understanding of how the economic position of spouses relative to one another
alters during the course of their marriage.
2. Changes during relationships
Relational contract accounts well for incremental change in
obligations within marriages. Macneil observes that much change in ongoing
contractual relations comes about "glacially," through small, day-to-day
adjustments.62 In contrast, the social obligation model seems less equipped to
accommodate a relationship, such as the Bracklows', that changes over time.63
Instead, this model often characterizes a marrri age once and for all at the time
the marital obligations were first assumed, using promise theory to look at the
responsibility consensually undertaken for the other spouse. The social
obligation model and the clean-break model suggest that a marriage is
fundamentally one or the other, not that parties might develop greater mutual
reliance over time and that incremental alterations can amount to radical
changes to the nature of the relationship. In contrast, relational contract is
alert to the possibility of new, legally enforceable obligations calcifying in the
interstices of lived interaction.
Particularly during a long marriage, the parties may gain or lose
ground relative to the other. Such changes are probably unintended, though
given the statistics on female poverty after divorce, they are clearly not
unforeseeable. 64 Indeed, assuming the specialization of labour typical within
marriages, where generally both parties do not perform identical functions
inside and outside the home, it would be unusual if the parties maintained
their original relative positions. Relational contract recognizes that changes
after divorce all too often lead to poor economic conditions for women. While
62 See I.R. Macneil, "Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations under Classical,
Neo-classical, and Relational Contract Law" (1978) 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 854 at 895 [hereinafter "Long-
term Economic Relations"].
63 The Bracklows began by splitting household expense strictly and moved over time towards less
precise sharing as it was "more of a marriage" (Bracklow, supra note I at 425).
64 See e.g. Moge, supra note 33 at 854, where Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 observes the grim economic
effects of divorce.
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the vocabulary sounds callous, Cohen is accurate when he states that over time
women lose value in the marriage market relative to men. He means that a
divorced woman's chances of remarriage are significantly less than those of a
divorced man.65 While each spouse makes investments during the marriage
that yield mutually enjoyed goods, in many "traditional" marriages the
husband's investments in his career and earning power survive the marriage,
while the wife's are idiosyncratic "sunk" costs (often in the form of a decision
to relegate her career to a lower priority than her husband's for the sake of
household tasks and child rearing)." Relational contract theory accommodates
this reality, recognizing the tremendous importance of sunk costs, those
investments that cannot be recovered and transferred.67 The result may be to
make the wife less willing than the husband to terminate the relationship. 8
Even when parties begin as equals, then, the choices made and specialization
of labour assumed may "lock" some people into positions, raising concerns of
power, exploitation, and dependence.69
These relational contract insights may yield concrete legal or
interpretive rules.7° For example, courts frequently use marriage duration to
calculate the extent of dependence and the level of spousal support
subsequently required. Bracklow would lead judges to characterize a marriage
from the outset as following one of the models and to assess the impact of the
marriage's length accordingly. In contrast, relational contract would prompt
judges or legislators to expect that a marriage would change during its lifetime,
not just in the arithmetic extent of economic disadvantage suffered, but
qualitatively. Certainly the model of a marriage between two independent
economic units is most plausible for a brief union. More specifically,
Parliament might legislate a rebuttable presumption that after a certain
duration marriages would be presumed to have generated certain expectations
and interdependencies.
65 See the detailed analysis of this idea in Cohen, supra note 7 at 278-87.
66 See the discussion on the increase in the husband's human capital during the marriage as
compared with the wife's in Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 58 at 552-56. While the benefit to the
children of having had one parent at home presumably outlives the marriage, that benefit yields no
immediate financial return to the homemaker spouse.
6 7 See R.W. Gordon, "Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract
Law" [1985] Wis. L. Rev. 565 at 570.
68 Ibid.
69 See S. Macaulay, "An Empirical View of Contract" [1985] Wis. L. Rev. 465 at 469.
70 Other commentators have used the relational contract model to hypothesize default rules. See
e.g. Scott & Scott, supra note 26 at 211 ff.
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In identifying idiosyncratic investments and sunk costs, relational
contract theory provides checks against blind reliance on a strict notion of
equality.71 Such a notion may be a well-intentioned reaction against the
historic concept that the wife was inferior and melded her legal personality
into her husband's. Yet the parties, while perhaps equal before the law, are
not economically equal if one has made costlier sacrifices than the other.
Indeed, the suggestion has been made that in divorce the parties may stand in
inherently unequal positions.72 Relational contract realizes that only rarely are
parties to a marriage self-sufficient atoms. Its account of changing economic
power dynamics between the parties thus acknowledges some of the concerns
of feminist scholars, and makes it possible to consider the status of marriage
as an institution and society's interest in regulating bargaining within it.
3. Marriage and society
The extent to which the law permits private ordering by the parties to
determine their marriage model depends on the relationship between
marriage as an institution and the interests of society. Society's interest in
marriage is perhaps more forcefully articulated within the civilian tradition
than in the common law. The civil law, for example, observes that the way in
which marriage and divorce are regulated produces the signification that
society wishes to assign the relation between private life and citizens.73
Moreover, even from a perspective favouring private ordering, society retains
important social interests in the process of marriage and divorce negotiations,
and the fairness of their outcomes.
Indeed, it becomes evident that even in intimate relationships, the very
notion of "private" ordering outside the law is illusory. As Macneil notes,
society is the "fundamental root" of contract; 74 it may be necessary, then, to set
aside the abstraction that views a contract as relating only to the two so-called
On the limitations of liberal feminism and formal equality in the divorce context, see A.
Harvison Young, "The Changing Family, Rights Discourse and the Supreme Court of Canada" (2001)
80 Can. Bar Rev. 749 at 763.
72 See M.L. Fineman, "Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of
Property at Divorce" (1989) 23 Fam. L.Q. 279 at 299. Relational contract provides a helpful
counterbalance even to legislative rhetoric on equality, as in the FLA, supra note 50, Preamble.
73 See 1. Th6ry, Le dimariage: justice et vie privge (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1993) at 10.
See New Social Contract, supra note 7 at 1. See also J. Carbonnier, Flexible droit: pour une
sociologie du droit sans rigueur, 10th ed. (Paris: L.G.D.J., 2001) at 260-62.
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parties.7 5 In any case, private ordering always presupposes state enforcement
and falls back onto state-made default rules.76 Nevertheless, there is a
suggestion within the literature on marriage as relational contract that
marriage, until the parties turn to the divorce courts, is somehow outside
"[l]aw's domain."77 Perhaps this suggestion flows from the observation that
parties to a relational contract tend to resolve conflicts internally,
contemporaneously with the exchange. 8 More precisely, though, the law is
always present, and even happy families are "rife with rules of everyday law. 7 9
The constant presence of the law may be more visible under civil law, where
the very organization of Book Two of the Civil of Code of Quibec indicates
that marriage falls within the ius commune;8° in contrast, the common law
provinces have no Happy Marriages Act. Nevertheless, the application of
spousal support to economic factors and not the marriage's "emotional and
social benefits"'8 t should not be taken as an indication that the law is not
present in the exchange and enjoyment of those benefits. Even if during their
marriage spouses perceive that they occupy a non-legal space of merely "social
and relational norms, '8 2 it is clear to others, particularly to gays and lesbians
to whom the institution is unavailable, that spouses occupy a privileged
position saturated with law.8" The better view, then, is that spouses operate
75 See S. Rials, Jilley et les idoles: petile introduction L la philosophiedu droitde Michel rilley (Paris:
Quadrige, 2000) at 45.
76 For further argument against the notion of a private domain respecting the family, see,
discussing child support, R. Buchanan, "Deadbeat Dads in Global Perspective: A Comment on Mary
Jane Mossman" (1997) 46 U.N.B.L.J. 89 at 93, noting the "surprising amount" of proactive state action
required by privatization and deregulation.
77 See Scott & Scott,supra note 26 at 202. For a critical discussion of the view that intimacy should
keep law out of sentimental matters such as marriage, see N. Kasirer, "Honour Bound" (2001) 47
McGill L.J. 237 at 248--9.
78 See "Une th~orie pluraliste du contrat," supra note 7 at 286. But see B. Yngvesson, "Re-
Examining Continuing Relations and the Law" 1 1985] Wis. L. Rev. 623, suggesting that parties in long-
term relations do in fact litigate while continuing their exchange and that their reliance on informal
methods of dispute resolution is overstated.
79 See N. Kasirer, "Testing the Origins of the Family Patrimony in Everyday Law" (1995) 36 C.
de D. 795 at 801 [hereinafter "Family Patrimony in Everyday Law"].
80 See arts. 365ff., 493ff. C.C.Q.
See e.g. Moge, supra note 33 at 848.
82 See Scott & Scott, supra note 26 at 202.
83 See e.g. M. Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Se, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (New
York: Free Press, 1999) at 107 noting the weight of the legal force and cultural normativity of marriage
as a public institution, not a private relation. He also comments on the legal status of marriage as always
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always within law, but do not usually turn to legal enforcement mechanisms
until the relationship has deteriorated and is effectively over.' 4 The law relating
to marriage may be viewed as a house. Its entitlements shelter the spouses and
its doors offer an exit from the relationship. Just as the enclosed space within
a house, though not timber or brick, is still house, the space within a marriage
is law.
This view of the importance of law even within marriages leads to the
established Canadian approach to contract varying the terms of a marriage.
The law changed with relative speed from declaring unenforceable prenuptial
and separation agreements altering certain terms of a marriage to upholding
them most of the time," subject to protective measures respecting children
and the general regime of contract, including the doctrine of
unconscionability. 86 The DivorceAct and provincial family legislation provide
default rules around which the marrying parties contract. 87 Default rules
theory provides that the parties are "implicitly committing" themselves to the
jurisdiction of a legal system that will use the "background rules" of contract
to fill gaps in their agreement8 There is implicit consent when the parties had
the option of contracting out of background rules but did not do so. Contract
theorists do not oppose the state's involvement in implementing such rules,
enforceable against third parties. See ibid. at 117. But see "Family Patrimony in Everyday Law," supra
note 79 at 817, where Kasirer writes that de facto unions are themselves subject to "intense regulation
despite the apparent absence of rules."
84 Indeed, Belley argues that a relational contract becomes a transactional contract when it ends,
the parties retaining nothing but "la precision et l'esprit de liquidation de ceux pour qui le voyage est
termind." See "Une throrie pluraliste du contrat," supra note 7 at 291.
85 See e.g. D.G. Duff, "The Supreme Court and the New Family Law: Working through the Pelech
Trilogy" (1988) 46 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 542 at 551- 2 See Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801 [hereinafter
Pelech]; Richardson v. Richardson, [19871 1 S.C.R. 857; and Caron v. Caron, [19871 1 S.C.R. 892.
86 There are admittedly a number of such measures by which courts resist enforcement of
agreements (see e.g. D.A.R. Thompson, "When Is a Family Law Contract Not Invalid, Unenforceable,
Overriden or Varied?" (2001) 19 C.F.L.Q. 399). The uncertainties that Thompson notes probably
indicate an inconsistency between judicial treatment of support contracts and the Supreme Court's
emphasis on the importance of finality elsewhere in family law, as in Van de Perre v. Edwards, [20011
S.C.R. 1014 at 1024-5.
87 Compare the regime of the family patrimony and compensatory allowance rendered imperative
by art. 391 C.C.Q.
88 See R.E. Barnett, "The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent" (1992) 78
Va. L. Rev. 821 at 828.
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although they may criticize them for producing unintended or unjust
consequences.89
Since marriages and negotiations before and during them operate
within law's domain, the courts have a significant interest in them. Thus,
although parties may deviate to some extent from the default rules, contract
theory alerts courts to the necessity of enforcing such agreements cautiously
because of the possibility of "contracting failures.'"9 Contract theorists have
identified a number of factors associated with marriage that may produce
such failures, and that militate for caution in enforcing agreements and
might rebut a presumption of enforceability. One is the cognitive
shortcomings of parties beginning long-term relations. Another factor that
limits the parties' ability to contract rationally is that typically they are
"unduly optimistic,""t at least in light of the sobering statistics on marriage
breakdown. A third is that promissory expression is always "fragmentary"
in the sense that parties can never anticipate ex ante every contingency or
deal with every detail of the intended performance and relationship. 92
Finally, some scholars suggest that women may have a "bargaining
disadvantage" that bears upon them in negotiations before marriage and on
divorce, 9' perhaps because such negotiations occur "in the shadow of
powerful cultural expectations." 94
Relational contract's sharp awareness of potential problems in
private ordering confronts Parliament with policy choices, such as the
balance it wishes to achieve between subjective and objective appreciations
of how the parties have structured their relationship. A more subjective
89 See e.g. Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 58 at 551, commenting on the "inadequacy" of
default entitlements that differ from those that "rational parties would have chosen ex ante."
90 See Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 58 at 550.
91 M.A. Eisenberg, "The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract" (1994-95) 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 211 at 251-52.
92 See "The Many Futures of Contracts," supra note 17 at 726-27.
93 See e.g. C.M. Rose, "Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground" (1992) 78 Va. L. Rev.
421 at 433.
94See A.L. Wax, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian
Marriage?" (1998) 84 Va. L. Rev. 509 at 585. But see C. Martin, "Unequal Shadows: Negotiation
Theory and Spousal Support under Canadian Divorce Law" (1998) 56 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 135 at 159 for
the negotiation theory argument that systemic disadvantages experienced by women result not from
"immutable gender differences" but rather from their position as support claimants within the Canadian
legislative framework. Martin's argument is useful insofar as it emphasizes the difficulties of the
claimant, but it is perhaps better viewed as an addition to, rather than a turn away from, earlier
arguments focusing on gender disadvantages; for example, Wax's "cultural expectations" are not linked
to biology.
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approach would press judges to read the facts scrupulously, seeking
evidence in the parties' conduct of their intentions. Specifically, relational
contract theory would alert a judge to obligations never expressly created,
to the likelihood that parties would share responsibility for sunk costs, and
to the compensatory protection of generous conceptions of reliance and
expectations. By contrast, a more objective approach might implement
general default and even imperative rules, such as a universal sunset clause
of five or ten years in contracts restricting support obligations, based as
much on the assumption that relationships change over time as on the
empirical data that parties in deep relationships do not accurately project
their present relationship into a less happy future. Presumably parties,
again advised by counsel, could renew the agreement for a further period.
Another objective rule might be the interpretive presumption that major
decisions, such as those relating to one party's career, were made jointly for
the benefit of the relationship and thus for both parties. Such an approach
might assist in characterizing the economically stronger spouse's career
potential, possibly including professional degrees obtained, as an asset of
the joint endeavour.
By recognizing the potential contracting difficulties, relational
contract avoids blind enforcement of agreements governing intimate
relationships. This caution is critical because automatic enforcement would
augment the "persistent tendency" to simply replicate market failings within
the sphere of the family.95 Such replication would be a risk if relational
contract were less sensitive to the behaviour of trusting parties in long
relationships. But the theory's recognition of cognitive impediments and
power imbalances indicates that preferring it as a marriage model would
not be a step backwards for those traditionally less well served by family
law. Indeed, because relational contract integrates the concerns addressed
by the Supreme Court's marriage models, it can replace the competition
between models and operate satisfactorily as a default conceptualization.
It is possible to strike an appropriate balance of concerns within relational
contract. A further advantage of relational contract is that it accounts well
theoretically for legislative and jurisprudential treatment of affective
partners who are unmarried.
95 See F.E. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1983) 96
Harv. L. Rev. 1497 at 1530.
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4. Unmarried couples
Increased legislative and judicial recognition of unmarried couples
has come so quickly that the impact on marriage remains inadequately
explored. Yet marriage cannot be unaffected by the recognition of some of
those obligations between individuals who have exchanged none of the
statutorily defined promises framed with formalities set out in legislation
and the Civil Code of Qudbec. Indeed, in the eyes of neo-classical contract
theorists, unmarried individuals may well have no enforceable contract at
all. Yet if an unmarried cohabiting couple is subject to the same support
regime as a married couple under provincial law, the wedding adds much
less than it once did.96
Relational contract analysis yields at least two positions respecting
the relation between married and unmarried couples. Some theorists see
deeper contract analysis as strengthening the obligations of marriage and
distinguishing it more sharply from other relationships. 97 For example, Scott
and Scott view a cohabitation relationship as a "more limited undertaking"
in which the parties are at liberty to terminate unilaterally without lingering
obligations.9" But this distinction no longer exists in Canadian law. Subject
to the statutory requirements, spouses may unilaterally seek termination of
their marriage by the court,99 and even unmarried couples cannot
necessarily exit their relationship without the court recognizing continuing
obligations.' 0 It is thus difficult to maintain a clear distinction between
married and unmarried couples.
The position most internally consistent is that relational contract
analysis reduces distinctions between married and unmarried couples.
96 See e.g. FLA, supra note 50, ss. 29ff. The significance of the family property legislation
applicable only to married couples increases proportionately with a couple's wealth aside from wages.
The differences between married and merely de facto spouses are significantly greater in Quebec.
9 7 See e.g. Brinig, supra note 15 at 279, praising the Louisiana covenant marriage. For Trebilcock,
a contract analysis includes signalling concerns respecting formation andthe matching of parties seeking
relationships. He thus favours "more sharply differentiating marriage" from other intimate relationships
as a means of producing greater clarity in the search for partners. See M.J. Trebilcock, "Marriage as
a Signal" in Buckley, supra note 15, 245 at 251.
98 See Scott & Scott, supra note 26 at 214.
99 Divorce Act, supra note 12, s. 8.
100 Even where unmarried cohabitation is virtually invisible to the ius commune, courts are
"unwilling" to subject vulnerable de facto spouses to strictly commercial assumptionswhen applying the
general regime of obligations. See D.M. Hendy & C.N. Stonebanks, "Strangers at Law? The Treatment
of Conjoints de Fait in the Civil Law of Quebec and the Development of Unjust Enrichment" (1995)
55 R. du B. 71 at 103.
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Robert Scott has written that in relational contract the terms are not
knowable or able to be articulated at the start of the relationship, and
Macneil alerts us to the unavoidable gap between the terms of a particular
promise and its contractual performance. The gap between these two is the
"shadow" or non-promissory part of the contractual relation.'' Thus, even
obligations that flow not from the terms of their wedding vows but from the
relation they have lived bind married couples. Similarly, relational contract
theory recognizes tacit assumptions that, if mutual, can serve the same
"planning function" as express mutual consent.'0 2
Relational contract does not require a clear beginning or a moment
of promise. Rather, the exercise of choice through contract is an
"incremental process" in which parties accumulate information and
gradually agree to more and more.'0 3 Indeed, there is often "much shading
of commencement," making it difficult to say when the relation began.'O° It
thus becomes difficult to distinguish marriage from cohabitation. If a
wedding is an exchange of promises that leads to other, non-promissory
obligations flowing from the lived relation, a promise between cohabiting
parties-to live together or to buy a house--might also serve as the initial
promise onto which they will subsequently graft non-promissory and tacitly
assumed elements. Even the initial promise may be tacit.
A difficulty for those who would defend a bright line between
marriage and cohabitation is that economic analysis of marriage erases any
such distinction. Both married couples and unmarried cohabitants may
exchange goods and specialize in tasks in an economically efficient way; such
activity is perhaps revealing of "household formation," but says little about
matrimony.0 5 This overlap is apparent in the civil law, where doctrine
recognizes that the vie commune marking marriage can equally mark de facto
unions, the difference being that vie commune is the essence of unmarried
relationships.'6 Assuming that unmarried people do not begin living together
without some sort of agreement-they must at the very least have agreed to
move in together-assessing relationships in terms of exchange suggests that
the distinction between married and unmarried couples is one only of degree.
101 See "The Many Futures of Contracts," supra note 17 at 731.
102 Ibid. at 773.
103 See "Economic Analysis of Contracts," supra note 18 at 1041.
104 See ibid. at 1028.
105 See e.g. W. Bishop, "'Is He Married?': Marriage as Information" (1984) 34 U.T.L.J. 245 at 246.
106 See e.g. "What Is Vie Commune?", supra note 29 at 518.
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Yet even such a distinction is not determinative, since some unmarried couples
invest far more deeply in their relationship than do some married couples.
The response that courts respect freedom of contract by honouring the
parties' deliberate choice not to marry 7 is problematic. For one thing, it is no
longer good law, even more so after the holdings in Miron and M. v. H.°8 For
another, this position elevates one act, or rather a non-act, to superiority over
the hundreds of choices of varying magnitudes made and the
interdependencies developed when two people cohabit. Macneil says that in
contract relations, obligations arise out of the ongoing processes of the
relation. The relation per se not only defines the content of obligations
mutually agreed, but in fact also "creates" obligation. 1°9 It is difficult to assert,
then, that cohabitants make no relationship-specific investments that would
result in compensable loss upon termination of the relationship. Relational
contract takes such created obligations into account, and given family law in
common-law provinces, so must any contemporary Canadian theory of
marriage. There is, admittedly, an important public and symbolic dimension
to marriage that the law may choose to recognize, but that dimension is not
reflected in the factors listed in provincial legislation for determining support.
Given its utility in analyzing the current regime of recognition of unmarried
couples, spousal support, and the other concerns discussed above, relational
contract appears to be a model well-suited for characterizing Canadian
marriage, and thus for structuring a consideration of the models of marriage
articulated by the Supreme Court.
III. LEGAL MODELS IN BRACKLOW
Defining legal models in any context poses difficulties. The challenge
that the Supreme Court undertook in Bracklow, however, was particularly
complex because the law of spousal support was previously, in the words of
one judge, a "jurisprudential embarrassment."" ° Spousal support requires
models both flexible enough for legally characterizing "an almost infinite
number of situations and life experiences"'' and also structured enough to
107 The minority took this position in Miron, supra note 30 at 451--52.
108 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3.
109 "The Many Futures of Contracts," supra note 17 at 786.
110 See Keller v. Black (2000), 182 D.L.R. (4th) 690 at 705 (Ont. Sup. Ct.). In the same passage
Quinn J. describes as "unnerving" that a trial judge and an appellate court could be so wrong on the law
of family support as to precipitate the Supreme Court's unanimous reversal in Bracklow.
III Boston, supra note 61 at 447.
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assist trial judges. Given these requirements, Bracklow merits study, not only
for its substance, but also for its capacity to serve as a case study for the
questions raised more generally in the use of legal models.
A. Conceptual Challenges
Bracklow is indicative of both the difficulty of defining models
appropriately and of the conceptual murkiness that may followwhen analytical
models are insufficiently distinct. This section first assumes that there are, in
fact, three distinct theories of spousal support in the judgment," 2 and then
shows that the theories collapse upon one another, even within the Court's
reasons.
These theories, at least as set out, are problematic. Superficially, the
names of the models of marriage and theories of support have limited
utility. It is perhaps obvious that the negative label "non-compensatory"
does not pin down this model, leaving it free to be anything else. Given that
this model is contrasted with both compensatory and contractual theories
of support, it seems justifiable to assume that "non-compensatory" is meant
to be neither compensatory nor contractual; it would otherwise be a
subcategory of a broader notion of contractual compensation. Its
alternative name, "basic social obligation," is only marginally better, leaving
unstated what is basic about the obligation and what "social" means in this
context. The model's potential breadth and the support to which it gives rise
have not escaped the notice of trial judges."1
3
More substantively, marriage has changed so much that the social
obligation theory is no longer even internally consistent. This theory is
predicated on society's commitment to lifelong marriage. Once, however,
marriage is not for life-divorce is available with relative ease (legally, though
of course not emotionally) and without incurring societal condemnation-it
is not obvious why the support obligation engendered by lifelong marriage
would survive."' There is little foundation for holding that, once marriage
112 The reasons do not indicate that there is no overlap between the theories, but suggest that they
are distinct. See Bracklow, supra note I at 436 (the models of marriage representing "markedly
divergent philosophies, values, and legal principles").
113 InArruda v. Arruda ([1999] B.C.J. No. 2296 at para. 34 (S.C.), online: QL (BCJR) [hereinafter
Amida]), Boyle J., the trial judge in Bracklow, queried whether the case was one for compensation, for
contract, or for the "clean-up and catchall 'basic social obligation' model".
114 Regan notes that alimony developed historically when divorces were "rarely granted" and was
continued without explicit justification after divorce became more readily accessible. See supra note 24
at 44. Eekelaar observes the short pedigree of the lifelong support obligation flowing from marriage;
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itself is altered from a lifelong commitment to one terminable on petition by
a spouse, the corresponding obligation of spousal support can survive in some
circumstances, only slightly reduced. Justice McLachlin's "broad strokes""'
overlook the important theoretical link between social obligation and fault,
and that the possibility of alimony was often viewed primarily as the husband's
deterrent from breaking his marriage vows.116
The Court overestimates the necessity of the social obligation theory
in adequately compensating spouses who have made sacrifices. If a court
accepts some of the compensation possibilities outlined in the discussion on
spousal support above, even cases of post-divorce illness, such as Bracklow,
may be seen as compensatory. A court would compensate for the reasonable
expectation of future support, or more specifically the expectation that the sick
party would not be ill and poor immediately after the marriage while the other
spouse was financially better off. Absent such expectation between the parties
ex ante-and in Bracklow the trial judge found no such explicit or implicit
agreement-there is no way of justifying support merely on the vestiges of a
model of marriage that society no longer endorses. Retaining the social
obligation model, however, spares the Supreme Court the possibly
embarrassing task of articulating precisely the sorts of contractual
expectations it is prepared to recognize as reasonable and compensable.
While the social obligation theory in the judgment is too big, the
compensatory theory is correspondingly too small and simplistic. For example,
the potential raised by the Court for a support obligation specifically
characterized as "lifelong""1 7 would already be included in a broader
conception of compensation. Justice McLachlin's pithy statement, "There
are no magical cut-off dates,""1 8 stands alone if understood to mean that the
applicable compensation principles will determine an ex-spouse's
obligations, which will not necessarily be lessened by a limitation period. As
discussed above, during an intimate relationship, married or unmarried, one
support obligations in nineteenth-century England were based on de facto economic dependence. See
J.M. Eekelaar, "Family Law and Social Problems" (1984) 34 U.T.L.J. 236 at 241-42. This history
reduces the persuasive authority of the social obligation model's exchange of promises as giving rise to
support entitlement, as de facto dependence aligns more closely with some calculations within relational
contract compensation.
115 Bracklow, supra note 1 at 436.
116 For a good summary, see Regan, supra note 24 at 45-46. See also the discussion of the
connection between support and fault in C.J. Rogerson, "Spousal Support after Moge" (1996-97) 14
C.F.L.Q. 281 at 287-88.
1 17 Bracklow, supra note t at 452.
118 Ibid.
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party may make relationship-specific investments, the sunk costs of which
cannot foreseeably be shared fairly by the other party during a fixed period
within his lifetime. In such cases, the debtor party may never cease owing
support. This is all that "lifelong obligation" need mean. Many obligations
unrelated to marriage may turn out expost to have been lifelong, or at least
to have outlasted one of the parties; this can be the only sense in which
Justice McLachlin means "lifelong." Characterizing a mortgage not
discharged on death as lifelong adds little to the analysis; linking such a
contract to the life of one or both parties is irrelevant. "Lifelong" needlessly
evokes wedding vows, while the source of spousal support really lies in the
lived patterns of the relationship, with or without a wedding. If
compensating the wife for her idiosyncratic investments in the relationship
or for her losses takes the rest of the husband's life, so be it; what a court
awards then is spousal support determined by compensation principles, not
by the marriage vows. Similarly, a court awarding an elderly wife "lifelong"
support would not mean that the husband, if he won the lottery, could not
discharge his obligations by purchasing an annuity to pay the support owed.
Indeed, Bracklow is sympathetic to the idea of discharging the support
obligation by a lump payment, 19 consistent with the Court's recognition of
successive relationships and the new obligations they bring. 2'
Characterizing obligations as potentially lifelong detracts from a richer
appreciation of the possibilities of compensatory support.
Furthermore, the Court's statement that it is "well-settled law that
spouses must compensate each other for foregone careers and missed
opportunities during the marriage upon the breakdown of their union"''
is significantly less complex than the current regime. Moge advanced the law
in this area, but the law does not require restitution in the sense of full
compensation owed to both spouses for any missed opportunities. A wife
who chose lower-paying jobs for the sake of the marriage but is nevertheless
employed and self-sufficient at the end of the marriage is unlikely to be
awarded compensation -for the difference between her chosen career and
the one foregone, though she might be entitled to support on other
statutorily recognized grounds, such as contributions in raising the children.
The point is that the law does not recognize unconditional, internally
unlimited compensation.
Ibid. at 451.
120 See ibid. at 452.
12! Ibid. at 420.
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Similarly, Justice McLachlin's depiction of the clean-break model, in
which a payment is made in liquidation of obligations owed to the poorer
spouse and the parties proceed to autonomy, is too narrow. The clean-break
model is not inherently unfair; "clean-break" need not result in fifty-five-year-
old uneducated homemakers living on the street after thirty years of
marriage.2 How the parties achieve a clean break is itself not fixed, but is
rather a function of the policy determination by the legislatures and courts as
to which losses are compensable and how fully. Compensable losses could be
linked to household labour performed, foregone wages, lost earning capacity,
reliance, expectations, or any combination of these factors; there would be no
clean break, then, until discharge of the outstanding obligation, however
assessed. The tough policy decisions thus lie within compensation, not a
tension between compensation and another model. The Court's binary
opposition between compensatory and non-compensatory support obscures
that what to compensate is always a question of policy. The debate is best
framed as a compensation dilemma, and it need not rely on historical notions
of marriage.
The Court offers only a cursory depiction of the contractual basis
forentitlement. Most of the judgment suggests that the justices are thinking
only of express contracts, as in the Pelech trilogy. Once it is recognized that
contract law, and relational contract theory in particular, is more complex and
provides variations, it becomes difficult to maintain a theoretical division
between this source of obligations and the other two competing models of
support. Justice McLachlin herself recognizes this overlap briefly in the
judgment's historical section, where she notes that statutes require courts to
take into account support agreements between the parties, whether "express
or implied."' 23 Regrettably, she never returns to this notion of an implied
contract concerning support. Had she given more weight to implied contracts,
there would have been much less work for the non-compensatory support
model. This alternative would have been preferable, because courts are better
at filling in terms of a contract based on the parties' behaviour than at
calculating how much support "need" requires, once it is recognized that the
objective is not necessarily to satisfy that need fully. 24
Perhaps Justice McLachlin paid little attention to the definition of
contract because if she had, Mrs. Bracklow would have received nothing. The
122On the distinction between compensatory and clean-break theories, see D. Goubau, "The
Clear and Clouded World of Spousal Support in Canada" (2001) 18 C.F.L.Q. 333 at 339.
123 See Bracklow, supra note 1 at 432.
124 See ibid. at 451.
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reasons state that subject to judicial discretion, the parties may enhance,
diminish, or negate the obligation of mutual support "by contract or
conduct."' ' Any generous reading of this statement would give weight to
Justice Boyle's findings of fact at trial. Instead, the judge's finding that there
was "no express or implied agreement" between the Bracklows respecting
mutual support'26 serves as the basis for Justice McLachlin's holding that the
trial judge erred in law in his misconception of the default presumption of
"mutuality and interdependence."' 27 Yet the trial judge's other findings are
surely sufficient to rebut even Justice McLachlin's "correct" presumption,
notably that the Bracklows had an arrangement, "spoken or unspoken," that
apart from household expenses each would pay his or her own way.' 28 If this
unspoken arrangement fails to rebut the presumption, Justice McLachlin's
possibility of the parties' negating the obligation of mutual support by conduct
is slight indeed.
It is in this sense-in recognizing what the parties established by words
or conduct-that in some circumstances relational contract may limit support
obligations. In contrast to some relational contract theorists, who see a
contract model as leading to covenants and undertakings deeper than those
generally recognized by statutory regimes, t29 this article suggests that a
contractual analysis-looking to reasonable expectations, reliance, and
interdependence, and setting aside the sweeping language of marriage vows
and the historical background of the social obligation model-may lead to
obligations that are at least limited. That Mrs. Bracklow, after the marriage
ended, would rely on Mr. Bracklow if permitted to do so does not mean that
the two of them developed such dependence specifically through their relation.
125 Ibid. at 450.
126 Ibid. at 430.
127 Ibid. at 433.
128 Bracklow (trial), supra note 33 at 187. The judge also found that the terms of the particular
marriage were not of the kind where a wife, by agreement or implication, gives up her ability to earn
income outside the home in return for the husband's support (ibid. at 189). Compare Droit de la
famille-3169, [2000] R.J.Q. 2538 at 2541 (C.A.), in which the parties had established during their life
together a modus vivendi "bas6 sur l'id6e de soutien mutuel plut6t que d'ind6pendance."
129 See e.g. Brinig, supra note 15 at 279, on the need for a "right to fetter divorce rights". Scott &
Scott (supra note 26 at 209, 241) criticize current divorce law for foreclosing the "freedom to make
binding commitments" and limiting couples interested in "substantial commitment." It is perhaps an
exaggeration to suggest that the commitment of standard marriage, even under no-fault divorce, is
insubstantial.
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The individual definitions aside, a further problem is that the
models, as set out, are not distinct enough to aid judges. 3 ° Justice
McLachlin deliberately simplifies the models and the issues; the result is a
judgment much shorter and less embedded in doctrine than, for example,
Moge, which gives rise to a nagging sense that much has been swept aside.
Even within her reasons the non-compensatory model comes uneasily close to
being contractual, as when she writes that the mutual obligation model of
marriage stresses the interdependence created by marriage.131
Interdependence is not exclusively a contractual concept, but it plays a
significant role in relational, if not neo-classical, contract theory.132 More
fundamentally, the rationale for the mutual obligation theory is itself
contractual, the theory postulating that each spouse agrees to marriage and all
it entails, "including the potential obligation of mutual support.' ' 33 The
resultant loss of individual autonomy violates no premise of equality because
each party voluntarily cedes autonomy, 134 in a conception strikingly
contractual. In Justice McLachlin's view, the mutual obligation model
recognizes the difference between theoretical and actual independence, and
that there may be a mutual obligation of support "absent contractual or
compensatory indicators." '135 Given that the mutual cession of autonomy and
assumption of responsibility is contractual, however, this mutual obligation of
support does not arise and endure absent contractual indicators, but rather
precisely from the marriage contract. Another notion borrowed from contract
in the development of the Court's non-compensatory model is that a support
obligation may flow "from the marriage relationship and the expectations" of
the parties on marriage.'36
Justice McLachlin is concerned not to appear to ground a support
obligation in the status of marriage alone; she specifies that it is not the "act
130 But see C. Davies, "Spousal Support under the Divorce Act: From Moge to Bracklow" Case
Comment (1999) 44 R.F.L. (4th) 61 at 62, arguing that Bracklow is important because it draws a "clear
distinction" between compensatory and needs-based support.
131 Bracklow, supra note 1 at 436. See also ibid. at 437.
132 See e.g. Macneil ("Economic Analysis of Contracts," supra note 18 at 1033), who links
interdependence with future co-operation and solidarity, arguing that it often generates its own
momentum.
133 Bracklow, supra note 1 at 437.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid at 445-46, citing Story v. Story (1989), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 549 at 566 (B.C.C.A.), Proudfoot
J.A., concurring [hereinafter Story], cited in Moge, supra note 33 at 844--45 [McLachlin 's emphasis].
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of saying'I do', but the marital relationship" that may generate the obligation
of non-compensatory support. 137 Yet the close factual analysis that applying
such a statement requires is, again, profoundly contractual; it hangs on the
parties' behaviour towards one another during the relationship. This analysis
situates the entitlement in the expectations and tacit assumptions between the
parties, which Macneil argues arise during any relation under the "basic
contract interests" of restitution, reliance, and expectation.
138
In contrast, truly non-compensatory and non-contractual support
would exist in the air, and could be executed on evidence of one spouse's
ability to pay. Support can only be truly non-compensatory if the court
specifies that the award is made independently of any compensable
expectation or contractual term on the part of the receiving party. 39 In
contrast, "non-compensatory support" under Bracklow is deeply rooted in a
relational contract, and if the Supreme Court acknowledged the breadth of
potential compensation suggested in doctrine, it could characterize as
compensatory even what it appears to mean by non-compensatory support.1
40
Assessingwhether instances of non-compensatory support are better classified
as compensatory is important because, while many such cases could be
effortlessly recharacterized, an important few probably could not. In such
cases, a support obligation may be unfounded. Indeed, given the marriage
arrangement between Mr. and Mrs. Bracklow, theirs is probably one such case.
The "competing" models blend further because of the uncertain
relationship between claims made and rebutted under them. The Court is
vague as to the circumstances in which a negative finding under one model
would obviate a successful claim under another. Justice McLachlin says that
compensatory factors may be "paramount" where the economic loss is
discernible.14 ' But where it is impossible to determine the extent of the
economic loss of a "disadvantaged spouse," need and standard of living will
137 Bracklow, ibid. at 450.
138 See "Long-term Economic Relations," supra note 62 at 898.
139 Such support, to be purely non-compensatory, would probably have to be entirely prospective,
with no retrospective component. On the difficulty of determining non-compensatory support, see
Goubau, supra note 122 at 344.
140 On the risk that non-compensatory support will lead to judicial sloppiness and less rigorous
compensatory Moge analysis, see D.A.R. Thompson, "Rules and Rulelessness in Family Law: Recent
Developments, Judicial and Legislative" (2000-1) 18 C.F.L.Q. 25 at 64 [hereinafter "Rules and
Rulelessness"].
141 Bracklow, supra note I at 440.
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prevail. 42 If the compensatory and non-compensatory theories of support
entitlement are distinct, it is baffling that accounting difficulties encountered
while applying one theory would automatically activate another theory. The
limiting requirement in the adjective "disadvantaged" is ambiguous, as the
Court does not specify whether it requires only relative disadvantage as
between the spouses or a causal link between the conditions of the privileged
and the disadvantaged spouses. The imprecision around the competing models
opens the possibility that trial judges might, problematically, find no
compensation owed, and nonetheless turn to need and standard of living. 43
The result may be that applicants always gets two or three kicks at the spousal
support can.
Just as the categories collapse into each other within Bracklow-in the
recognition that both compensatory and non-compensatory support are,
ultimately, contractual, once this word signifies more than "expressly
contractual"-so confusion also prevails in subsequent cases attempting to
follow the judgment. Trial judges show considerable discomfort in applying
the Bracklow models.'" A number of judgments support the proposition that
the factors for analyzing non-compensatory support are better characterized
as contractual. 45 If the basis on which the parties entered the marriage sounds
142 Ibid., citing Ross v. Ross (1995), 168 N.B.R. (2d) 147 at 156 (C.A.), Bastarache J.A.
143 See Boston, supra note 61 at 451 --52, where Justice LeBel recognizes this possibility, admitting
that even when compensation concerns might otherwise predominate, courts may use the means and
needs of the parties because they supply the only available numbers.
144 Support has been awarded based on a "mix" of compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.
See Sowa v. Sowa (1999), 256 A.R. 341 at 344--45 (Q.B.), Mackenzie J. A master has observed that
categorizing spousal support based on distinct models is "not useful" because the categories so often
overlap. See Dainard v. Dainard, [ 19991 B.C.J. No. 2740 at para. 34 (S.C.), Master Nitikman, online: QL
(BCJR).
Two factors that are best understood as contractual appear in the post-Bracklow analysis of
non-compensatory support. First, the parties may have had an agreement of mutual support or of
support of the vulnerable spouse on marriage. See e.g. Tyeman v. Tyerman, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2327
(S.C.), Shaw J., online: QL (BCJR) [hereinafter Tyerman], where the trial judge begins the non-
compensatory analysis correctly, noting that in appropriate cases the wife's needs and inability to support
herself will play a "significant role" in determining spousal maintenance, but slides immediately into the
language of contract, finding that the parties married on the understanding that Mr. Tyerman would be
Mrs. Tyerman's sole source of financial support for the rest of her life (ibid. at para. 30). See also Arruda,
supra note 113 at paras. 37,38, finding a "basic social obligation" based on the "expectations and promise"
of the marriage on entry; and Da Costa v. Da Costa (1999), 46 R.F.L. (4th) 355 at 361 (B.C.S.C.), where
Justice Boyle finds an understanding of support of the homemaking wife as the foundation of the marriage.
Second, the parties may have conducted themselves during the marriage so as to make clear the obligation
of support. See e.g. the conduct of the parties in Tyerman, ibid.; and the "modus vivendi" in Droit de la
famile-3169, supra note 128 at 2541. For a comprehensive overview of the post-Bracklow jurisprudence,
see C. Rogerson, "Spousal Support Post-Bracklow: The Pendulum Swings Again?" (2001) 19 C.F.L.Q. 185
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only in non-compensatory, non-contractual support, contract as a source of
obligation is virtually eliminated.
Part of the problem may be that the models of marriage and spousal
support were not meant to coexist. Justice McLachlin credits an article by
Carol Rogerson with having identified the two "competing" theories of
marriage and post-marital obligation. 46 She does not, however, mention
that Rogerson 147 separates the models for analytical purposes, but notes
that they are not "pure" models, and that under existing legislation all three
models "interact and modify each other."'48 For Rogerson, separation is
useful because "ultimately a choice has to be made" as to which model
underpins spousal-support law.'49 In other words, Rogerson views the
coexistence of the three models as a problem that will prompt judges and
legislators to use them for assistance in articulating important concerns,
eventually picking one model as a conceptual foundation. It is significant
that the scholar who wrote the leading studies on the subject believed, at
least in 1989, that the uncertainty caused by competing models is
unsustainable. 0 In fact, cases after Bracklow demonstrate trial judges'
difficulties when critical issues lie across competing models.' 5' The
categories are confusing and not easily applied, and they obscure the main
question of how much courts are prepared to order compensated. As such,
they suggest the limited utility of competing models that raise questions about
at 219-51 [hereinafter "Spousal Support Post-Bracklow"].
146 See Bracklow, supra note 1 at 434. Justice McLachlin refers to Rogerson throughout the
reasons. Ibid. at 438,443,446,447, citing"Spousal Support after Moge," supra note 116; C.J. Rogerson,
"Judicial Interpretation of the Spousal and Child Support Provisions of the DivorceAct, 1985 (Part I)"
(1991) 7 C.F.L.Q. 155.
147 C.J. Rogerson, "The Causal Connection Test in Spousal Support Law" (1989) 8 Can. J. Fam.
L. 95.
148 Ibid. at 107.
149 Ibid.
150 Cossman, in contrast, bases her criticism on the Court's having "confused" Rogerson's models
of spousal support and conflated theories of marriage with theories of spousal support. See B. Cossman,
"Developments in Family Law: The 1998-99 Term" (2000) 11 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 at 447--48, n. 49.
Rogerson herself has characterized the Supreme Court's transposition of her models as "very jumbled
and almost unrecognizable." See "Spousal Support Post-Bracklow," supra note 145 at 201.
151See e.g. Dubreuil v. Dubreuil, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1389 at para. 54 (S.C.), Martinson J., online:
QL (BCJR) ("no simple answer" to question of spousal support entitlement and quantum); and Moen
v. Schultz (2000), 190 Sask. R. 223 at 2228--29 (Q.B.), Baynton J. (principles in Bracklow "easy to state
but much more difficult to apply"). For strong criticism of the decision because of the difficulties it
poses for appellate and trial judges, see "Rules and Rulelessness," supra note 140 at 55.
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the extent and flexibility of their application, both to individual parties and to
other similar legal relations.
B. Boundary Issues
1. Justice and the limits of contract
Bracklow's menu of three competing theories of spousal support
applying to different factual situations may suggest considerable flexibility for
particular couples, but the judgment reveals significant constraints on private
choice. Indeed, Bracklow shows a conflict between the articulated
acceptability of private ordering and the case's outcome. The Court reiterates
the position from Pelech, without citing the trilogy, that parties may disavow
financial interweaving by explicit contract or clear structuring of their life
together.'52 But by essentially rejecting the trial judge's finding of the
Bracklows' arrangement of independence, 153 Justice McLachlin derogates
from this principle, suggesting that the Court's "institutional
encouragement"'154 of negotiation and private ordering has diminished.
Though this result may be attributed narrowly to the trial judge's ostensible
error in conceiving the default allocation of responsibility, his finding was clear
enough that it ought to have rebutted even the correctly articulated
presumption of mutual support. Given the considerable, even excessive,
deference to findings of fact by trial judges that has recently marked the
Supreme Court's approach to family law,'55 this rejection of what is arguably
the crucial finding from trial suggests a more general reluctance by the Court
to permit parties to avoid support payments.
152 See Bracklow, supra note 1 at 434. Justice Wilson's position in Pelech has never been universally
shared, and the authority of the trilogy has been questioned. See G. (L.) v. B. (G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370,
L'Heureux-Dub6 J., concurring. It is nevertheless surprising to see it not even cited in Bracklow. On
recent judicial treatment of Pelech, see J.D. Payne, "An Overview of Theory and Reality in the Judicial
Disposition of Spousal Support Claims under the Canadian Divorce Act" (2000) 63 Sask. L. Rev. 403
at 429. See also Miglin v. Miglin (2001), 53 O.R. (3d) 641 at 654ff. (C.A.), Abella J.A., leave to appeal
granted (2001), 203 D.L.R. (4th) vi (S.C.C.)
153 Bracklow, ibid. at 452-53.
154 See J.-G. Belley, "Une justice de la seconde modernit6: proposition de principesg~nraux pour
le prochain Code deprocedure civile" (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 317 at 345, discussing negotiated justice.
155 See Hickey v. Hickey, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518 at 526. In "Spousal Support Post-Bracklow," supra
note 145 at 225, Rogerson observes that the deference doctrine effectively immunizes highly
individualized and discretionary decisions from appellate review.
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This disconnect between principle and result reveals ambivalence
about freedom of contract within marriage. At a high level of abstraction,
Bracklow may be seen as constituting, with Chartierv. Chartier'56 andM. v. H.,
a trilogy expanding the private support obligation of individual family
members.'57 Yet the distinction between Bracklow and the other cases is as
striking as their common stance of privatization. In Chartier and M. v. H., the
Court assimilated de facto relationships with de jure relationships giving rise
to enforceable support obligations. As it was reasonable in both cases to
suppose that no family law applied, none of the parties had attempted
consensually to alter a default support regime. In contrast, infBracklow, in the
context of the legally recognized relationship par excellence, the Court refused
to accept tacit private ordering that would have limited the parties'
obligations. Bracklow does not raise the recognition of new types of
relationships for the applicability of a statute, but rather the boundaries of
contract, the extent to which, in civil law terms, spousal support obligations
reveal an untouchable public order core.
Indeed, Justice McLachlin's comments may indicate the emergence
of a new notion of substantive justice within marriage. Evidence of such
change from the Supreme Court may lie in the unanimity of the trial and
Court of Appeal judges, all overturned. The Supreme Court's references to
justice, fairness, and equity throughout the judgment, and its exhortation to
trial judges to pursue these ideals in each situation,158 may thus be
disingenuous. The difficulty was not that the trial and appellate judges
followed other objectives, such as formalistic application of precedent, but
rather that they did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's evolving, still
inchoate, conception of justice and of how to measure justice in marriage.
Justice McLachlin's language indicates that this notion is rooted in
normative principles beyond the privatizing concern to reduce the state's
obligations, which she also recognizes."' She notes that the mutual obligation
156 (1998), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 [hereinafter Chartierl.
157 See Cossman, supra note 150 at 435. On privatization more generally, see e.g. S.B. Boyd,
"(Re)Placing the State: Family, Law and Oppression" (1994) 9:1 Can. J. L. & Soc. 39. She argues that
the courts' privatization of support will let society "off the hook" in dealing with the entrenchment of
women's roles and economic dependence. See ibid. at 69.
158 See Bracklow, supra note I at 438-9, 440, 442-4, 453-4. Indeed, such abstract notions are
probably much less helpful than a specific decision of quantum would have been. Given all the
information on the record, and that the parties had been in litigation for five years, it is surprising that
the Supreme Court refused to specify quantum and a duration. See "Rules and Rulelessness," supra
note 140 at 59.
159 Bracklow, ibid. at 437-8.
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model places the primary burden of support for a needy partner unable to
attain post-marital self-sufficiency on the partners to the relationship, rather
than on the state, in recognition of the "potential injustice of foisting a helpless
former partner onto the public assistance rolls."'60 Yet the justification for this
allocation does not seem to limit itself to the mutual obligation model; indeed,
it indicates a broader, underlying conception of justice. First, "foist" assumes
that the support obligation falls prima facie on the partners, since one can only
foist onto somebody else a responsibility already his or hers. In an inquiry as
to the existence of an obligation, then, the sentence precludes the possibility
that there is no obligation. Second, "injustice" is meaningful only in relation
to someone, but Justice McLachlin does not specify a potential injustice to
whom or why. This vagueness raises at least two possibilities. The potential
injustice may be one to individual spouses, but there is no explanation as to
why injustice would arise if informed parties had agreed not to support each
other. Alternatively, or conjunctively, the potential injustice may be to society
itself. The comment that the default presumption of mutual support comports
with Canadian society's "reasonable expectations"'' indicates the public
interest in spouses' caring for each other, perhaps in return for society's
benefits conferred on married couples. 62 The existing statutory limits on ex
ante private ordering affecting children already demonstrate a legislative
concern about third-party effects from contracting about marriage.'63 What
seems new, however, is the implicit characterization of the community as a
third party, with a legitimate interest in the private ordering between spouses
beyond the policing of merely procedural justice.'64 It seems now that waiving
spousal obligations may be substantively unfair to the community. At a time
of government cutbacks, such a new notion of substantive justice may well
accord with the mores of many members of society, but delineation of its
extent is required. The judgment does not indicate whether the concept will
intervene whenever a support claimant, if unsuccessful, would require public
support, or only on particularly compelling facts, such as illness and permanent
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid. at 433.
162 A less persuasive alternative is that Justice McLachlin means "reasonable expectations" as an
objective touchstone for interpretation of a particular marriage arrangement: members of society expect
that if they were married, they would be provided for, if necessary, by their respective spouses.
163 See e.g. Divorce Act, supra note 12, s. 15.1; and FLA, supra note 50, s. 52(1)(c).
164 Although the process/substance distinction has been questioned and in certain contexts may
require at least complication, it remains useful for present purposes. See e.g. D. Dyzenhaus & E. Fox-
Decent, "Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Bakery. Canada" (2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 193 at 196.
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disability. At the very least, it is difficult to reconcile the notion with the dictum
in Bracklow about parties' ability to waive obligations. The concept of justice
limiting contract requires further elaboration by the Court, particularly given
its potential application to couples not traditionally recognized as married.
2. The borders of marriage
Proponents of relational contract differ in their estimation of the
potential of default rules and legally imposed obligations to fortify
marriages. Some theorists think better-structured family law could save
marriages, or at least reduce the incidence of marriage breakdown in the
"less permanent world" of no-fault divorce; 16 5 others think contract, or any
law, can do little to save doomed relationships and, instead, should simply
help parties dissolve their relationship on fair terms. 6 Opposition
between these two positions is probably false, as good marriages benefit
from legal structures that prevent too-easy exit during the inevitable lows
of any long relationship, and such structures cannot save bad marriages.
What matters here, however, is the effects on the position of marriage in
Canadian society, not of positive law and legal institutions, but of the
judgment's articulation of models.
Many observers interpret Justice McLachlin's reasons and her
competing models as reinforcing the sanctity of marriage, 67 presumably
meaning marriage's position as the sexual relationship most recognized by
law. They point to reinforcements in statements such as "Marriage, while
it may not prove to be 'till death do us part', is a serious commitment not
to be undertaken lightly."'68 But what is evident from a reading of the
entire judgment is not any re-enforcement of the unique status of
marriage, but rather the further blurring of the line between married and
unmarried couples, and the imposition of potentially greater burdens of
support on the unmarried support debtor. Bracklow thus indicates that
legal models may simultaneously reinforce and unsettle the border
between the legal institution modelled and related institutions.
165 See e.g. Brinig, supra note 15 at 275-76, who believes that no-fault divorce has "spawned
substantial social problems." See ibid. at 275.
166 See "Relational Contracts," supra note 20 at 302.
167 See e.g. J.G. McLeod, "Annotation" on Bracklow v. Bracklow (1999) 44 R.F.L. (4th) 5 at 9.
168 Bracklow, supra note i at 452.
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It is possible to read the judgment as restricted to support between
married partners "because of the facts."'69 Justice McLachlin probably had
the circumstances in mind as she chose her words, but she did not limit her
comments to support between married spouses. Her use of "marriage" is
fluid. First, she uses the term to signify both relationship and wedding. 70
Second, she sometimes uses "marriage" to mean not only the three years
after the wedding, but also the four years of unmarried cohabitation.' 7 '
This usage matters because during the close factual analysis that
she says is so critical in balancing all relevant factors, Justice McLachlin
refers to the total length of the relationship. She writes, "While the
combined cohabitation and marriage of seven years were not long, neither
were they (by today's standards) very short."'72 This is troubling because
it is unlikely that she would make a similar statement about just three years
of marriage; even by today's standards, a three-year marriage is brief.'73
Despite her comments about marriage, she grounds the support
entitlement, in part, on a period of unmarried cohabitation. Her view of
the combined time does not indicate that the three years of marriage
weighed more heavily, or that the wedding represented a threshold
requirement making the four years of cohabitation count more
retroactively under provincial law. It was the total length of lived intimate
relationship that mattered, not the wedding.
The Court's reliance on the years of unmarried cohabitation is
significant for those who believe that increasing recognition of unmarried
couples somehow threatens the institution of marriage. Another concern
less grounded in morality is that the "valuable benefit" of marriage as a
169 McLeod, supra note 167 at 9.
170 When Justice McLachlin examines the loss caused by the "marriage or marriage breakup," she
means marriage as relationship. See Bracklow, supra note 1 at 443. Elsewhere, however, when she
contrasts the "bare fact of marriage" with the "the relationship" (ibid. at 445), "marriage" must mean
the wedding. Similarly, when she says "[m]arriage ... is a serious commitment", that commitment is likely
the wedding, because the significant undertaking associated with a marriage is the wedding; time after
the wedding is the working out of that undertaking. See ibid. at 452.
171 See ibid. at 425. McLachlin J.'s focus on the entire period of cohabitation has been noticed
judicially (see Droit de lafamille-3169, supra note 128 at 2541) and extrajudicially (see M.-J. Brodeur,
"Les effets de l'arrt Bracklow: un support priv6 pour I'ex-6poux en remplacement d'un r6gime public
d'assurance-maladie?" in Diveloppements rdcents en droitfamilial (2000) (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais,
2000) 1 at 46).
172 See Bracklow, ibid. at 453 [emphasis added].
Statistics Canada reports that in 1998 the average duration of a marriage ending in divorce was
13.7 years across Canada, 15.1 years in Quebec, and 12.8 years in British Columbia (survey of 69,088
people, Publication #84F0213XPB).
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"signal" is further reduced. 174 From a signalling perspective the institution
of marriage is valuable for what it tells prospective partners willing to enter
it; it also permits society to make presumptions based on persons' marital
status and apply these to an "extraordinarily varied" set of decisions. 7'
The judgment is also important from the perspective of unmarried
cohabiting persons. Justice McLachlin does not comment on the "current
practice" of applying the principles developed in respect of married
couples to determine support for unmarried couples under provincial
family law,176 but some trial and appellate judges have read her silence as
tacit approval for doing so.' Such laws recognize spousal support
obligations between unmarried persons, initially opposite-sex and now also
same-sex. 178
The current law is particularly problematic because the family
legislation now applicable to same-sex couples may rely, afterBracklow, on
the social obligation model of marriage. The full privileges of marriage
remain restricted to opposite-sex couples, because of the institution's firm
grounding in the legal tradition.179 Nevertheless, where courts detect the
possibility of easing the burden on the public purse, 80 it seems that they
will find that the inter partes obligations of support associated with
marriage are less deeply rooted and can, in fact, be successfully
transplanted to same-sex couples. It is probably inappropriate to interpret
174 See e.g. Bishop, supra note 105 at 261.
17. See ibid. at 258.
176 See McLeod's comments, supra note 167 at 9.
177 See e.g. Arruda, supra note 113, where Justice Boyle states at para. 34 that Bracklow governs
all family cases where support is claimed. See also Russell v. Russell (1999), 180 Sask. R. 196 at 227--28
(C.A.), Jackson J.A. (Bracidow applying to provincial family support legislation); Henderson v.
Scarborough, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1960 at para. 27 (S.C.), Grist J., online: QL (BCJR), cited with approval
in Frederkind v. Frederkind, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2476 at para. 31 (S.C.), MacKenzie J., online: QL (BCJR).
A Quebec judge has also used Bracklow in determining support under art. 511 C.C.Q., which is
conceptually distinct from the Divorce Act support. See N.A. v. JL., [2001] J.Q. No. 2743 at para. 78
(Sup. Ct.), S~vigny J., online: QL (QJ), aff'd (13 March 2002), Montreal 500-09-011123-015 (C.A.).
178 See e.g. Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, ss. 1(1) "spouse," 87ff., as am. by S.B.C.
1997, c. 20, s. 1(c) [hereinafter FRA]; FLA, supra note 50, ss. 29ff., as am. by Amendments Because of
the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H. Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 6, s. 25(2).
179 See Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 536, La Forest J. See also Cory J.'s insistence that
same-sex support obligations have "nothing" to do with marriage. M. v. H., supra note 108 at 48. For
Parliament's defensive assertion that marriage remains the union of "one man and one woman", see
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12, s. 1.1), and EGALE Canada v. Canada
(A.G.), [2001] 11 W.W.R. 685 (B.C. S.C.)
180 See M. v. H., ibid. at 76.
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provincial family law as it applies to same-sex couples-perhaps to
unmarried opposite-sex couples too-on the basis of the social obligation
model of marriage. In moving from a traditional, religiously based notion
of dependence and dominance to one of equal mutuality between
consenting spouses,' this model has already undergone breathtaking
change. It seems incongruous that the same model should govern
unmarried spouses who have never undertaken even the "serious
commitment" of marriage,'82 having merely lived together for a statutory
threshold period that varies by province. A solution is that the obligations
of the FRA or FLA on unmarried couples might be less. Unlikely as this
might seem, Justice McLachlin would probably be uneasy applying
provincial legislation to an unmarried couple on the basis that cohabiting
two years or more, "while perhaps not 'till death do us part,"' is a serious
commitment not to be undertaken lightly.
Justice McLachlin's alternations between "marriage," "marital
relationship," and "relationship" conceal the fact that the terms are not
always interchangeable. For example, reference to the expectations of the
parties on marriage appears inflexible.'83 Transferred to a cohabitation
context, it is unclear whether it would mean the expectations that the
parties had when they moved in together, or two or three years later, since
cohabitation, as an informal relational contract, need have no moment of
formally, publicly exchanged consent and formation equivalent to a
wedding. Bracklow, then, uses analytical steps that do not logically apply
to unmarried couples to reach conclusions that bind them. The effect is to
impose obligations of marriage on persons who are not privy to the
institution's full benefits and privileges, and who never made the same
undertaking.
When Justice McLachlin says that marriage is not to be taken
lightly, she seems to mean the wedding. But if she would not replace
"marriage" (as wedding) with the closest equivalent applicable to
unmarried couples, that is, cohabitation past the statutory threshold, then,
at least concerning unmarried couples, she seems to mean that something
other than the mere formal promising is a serious commitment. At least
concerning unmarried couples, she must mean something like this:
Developing a deep exchange relation on economic, sexual, and emotional
levels, and generating reliance, expectations, and interdependence over
181 Bracklow, supra note I at 434, 437.
182 Ibid. at 452.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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time should not be undertaken lightly. The next question is whether Justice
McLachlin means marriage as wedding when she discusses why married
couples are subject to the potential of substantial, lifelong obligations. It
is not impossible that, under the same provincial statute, married persons
would owe obligations because they had had a wedding, and cohabiting
persons would owe similar obligations because they had developed an
intimate, economically entwined relation. Such parallel foundations for
obligations are nonetheless untidy. Indeed, the sense emerges from Justice
McLachlin's reasons that, even for married couples, it is not the wedding
that matters, but the relationship. 8 4 When the same obligation arises for
unmarried couples from the relationship, and for married couples from the
marital relationship, the adjective seems to add little. This difficulty recalls
the relational contract observation that analysis of marriages often
becomes analysis of households, yielding the conclusion that the only legal
differences brought about by weddings relate not to the essential nature
of the particular relationship, but only to the statutory provisions and
privileges that ought to apply. Avoiding this conclusion requires the
concession that provincial family legislation applies less stringently to
unmarried couples. If, however, the legislation does apply equally,
discussion about the burdens that brides and grooms assume on their
wedding day can only be icing on the cake of their contractual relation.
Thus, because the notions of responsibility in the models transcend
marriage, Bracklow, instead of reinforcing any sanctity of marriage, effaces
to some degree the line between married and unmarried couples.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law post-Bracklow is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.
It is confusing and makes it hard for spouses to know the extent of their
obligations, and to predict when, or even if, a court will accept
arrangements that they have themselves made and lived by. It is also
troubling because it obscures distinctions between married and unmarried
couples. Perhaps the Supreme Court wished to avoid articulating just how
much the incremental increases in recognition of unmarried couples have
eroded the special status of marriage; perhaps the Court is still absorbing
the effects of such changes to treatment of unmarried couples, both
opposite-sex and same-sex. The tension between the availability of no-fault
184 See supra note 137 and preceding text.
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divorce and the retrenchment of the welfare state further complicated the
Court's task.
The judgment's effect, however, is to increase a support obligation
that applies alike to married and unmarried couples while some marriage
privileges are still withheld from unmarried couples, especially same-sex
couples, who lack even the choice to marry. Concerning same-sex couples,
the Supreme Court in Bracklow continues its pattern of more easily
recognizing interpartes obligations resulting from domestic relationships
than extending government benefits. Yet because some passages, out of
context, can be cited as upholding the so-called sanctity of marriage,
Bracklow potentially reduces the chance for recognition of same-sex
marriage. In contrast, a relational contract analysis, by focusing on
households instead of the distinction between married and unmarried
couples, would make achieving such recognition easier. At a time when the
Supreme Court may wish to avoid further charges of judicial activism, it is
significant that relational contract provides a characterization of the
disparity in regimes applicable to same-sex couples not as an infringement
of equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,8'
but rather as a private law problem of inconsistent treatment of contracts.
Complex questions of how to frame the story of a marriage and
determine spousal support can be dealt with more simply within relational
contract. 8 6 It is simpler from the trial judge's perspective to view the
factors and objectives in subsections 15.2(4) and 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act
as tools with which to reconstruct a failed relational contract than as a
competition between two models of marriage. The literature on relational
contract is sensitive to the tension in family law between independence and
community, and so is adequate to replace, for analytical purposes, the
broad social obligation model and the unduly restrained compensatory
model articulated by the Court. Relational contract, with its sensitivity to
the non-promissory elements of deep exchange relations and of potential
failures of contracting, provides a methodology for scrutinizing a particular
marriage and its agreements and obligations. The model, as essentially a
middle ground, is defter and thus more useful than a competition between
185 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11, s. 15(1).
186 It is possible that the Court's new "functional, child-centred" approach to support of children
by step-parents, based on "the reality of relationships,".indicates connections with relational contract,
particularly in the incremental formation of deep relationships. See A. Harvison Young, "This Child
Does Have 2 (Or More) Fathers ...: Step-parents and Support Obligations" (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 107
at 127.
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two more extreme positions. It is not that judges, legislators, or policy-
makers should not from time to time borrow from models set out in
Bracklow or elsewhere; relational contract should not be a juridical
straitjacket. Borrowing should, however, be deliberate.
Moreover, as this article indicates, defining legal models,
particularly competing models, poses complex challenges of
conceptualization and the determination of appropriate boundaries, both
within the category defined and between that category and similar ones.
The application of Bracklow's models to unmarried couples suggests that
models instantiating norms-here the appropriateness of enduring
obligations after an intimate relation-may not be tidily confined to their
original field. This hypothesis requires testing in other settings, but raises
implications about unintended consequences of scholars and judges using
legal models in other areas. Despite these challenges, however, courts
adjudicating divorce disputes continue to seek to define marriage models;
therefore, the best starting point in light of the contemporary regime is
relational contract.
1 87
There has been little Canadian literature on relational contract and
family law, so it is understandable why the Supreme Court approached
Bracklow using models taken freely from Rogerson's work, but this
approach is not the most useful. Recognizing three approaches avoids a
frank discussion of the kinds and extent of reliance and expectation that
will be compensable within intimate relations, thus downloading a complex
social question onto trial judges and obviating public debate on a national
level. The judgment is also a reminder that contractual compensation is
always a complex policy issue, and suggests that while the balance between
private ordering and default regimes is contingent and dynamic, even
where there appear to be numerous choices, there is a hardening core of
public order obligations concerning marriage. For trial judges to improve
their work, and for parties to be better equipped to tailor their own
particular norms and expectations and to reduce transaction costs by
negotiation and settlement, the default rules and presumptions, and the
ability to derogate from them, need to be articulated more clearly.
On another level, Bracklow is illustrative of the dialogue between
family law scholars, trial judges, and the Supreme Court. Legal scholarship
187 It is possible that commentators who would reject the wide discretion accorded trial judges in
favour of more rules may underappreciate the narrative component of adjudication, that parties may
expect the judge to do more than grind undisputed facts through a set of rules. If a judge is to write a
narrative, a structural device such as a model may be useful. See e.g. "Rules and Rulelessness," supra
note 140.
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has recently been more conscious of such dialogue in other areas, notably
constitutional law, although the parties in that conversation are generally
perceived to be the Court and the legislatures. In family law, where
organizing concepts such as marriage are both legal and social constructs,
the way in which ideas alter as they move between the three types of actors
deserves further study. In Bracklow, for example, the Court relied on social
concerns judicially articulated in Moge, but drawn extensively in that
judgment from family law scholarship. Bracklow shows the Court
advancing as sources of obligation, or at least as persuasive tools in
interpreting legislation, marriage models derived from Rogerson's
attempts not to prescribe, but merely to classify decisions by trial judges.
The Supreme Court's judgment may prove to be most enduring not as a
representation within family law of the institution of marriage at a
particular time, for the legal meaning of the institution will continue to
undergo legislative and judicial change, but as a reminder of the potential
normative influence that may be exercised by legal models.

